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Abstract 
 
What is the ontology of modern mass killing?  Why does mass killing occur in some conflicts 
and not others?  Much of the academic and policy literature uses methods that emphasize 
categorization that manifests as stages or discrete lists.  In this paper, I argue the complexity of 
human systems, including mass killing systems, deserves a greater role in prevention research 
and post facto analysis and I posit a hybrid schematic called geographic complex adaptive 
systems that combine complex adaptive systems and geographies of power.  They are explicitly 
geographic and utilize the unique ways that geographers see human systems - spatially, 
integrated, and constructed.  I outline how the schematic could apply to the case of mass killing 
in Democratic Republic of the Congo during the Second Congo War.  The case study offers 
support for the position that long-term power shifts in systems present opportunities for mass 
killing. 
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Introduction 
The mass killing of the twentieth century represents an inability of international actors, 
states, and communities to prevent the scourge of violence.1  From Armenia to Liberia, large-
scale political violence plagued a century popularly characterized by unprecedented progress.2  
In the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, intervention in Bosnia, and slaughter in Darfur, the 
international community functions in an unprecedented era of connectedness.  However, ongoing 
conflicts in Burma, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere 
underscore a need for a greater understanding of the ontology of mass killing, or how these 
episodes come to be.  With greater knowledge comes the potential for increased prevention 
capacity when coupled with political will and creative peacebuilding.  
There is a tendency in the literature to figure out how to stop the next episode.  The 
intention is more than curiosity or knowledge for knowledge’s sake, but rather a search for 
applied understandings that could stop people from dying.  However, there is another tendency 
among scholars and advocates to focus on response.  The Responsibility to Protect doctrine, an 
increasingly hegemonic foreign policy norm in the Northwest, is invoked as a way to respond to 
mass killing. Often missing from this discourse and policy is the prevention of mass killing.  
Despite economic advantages over response and the avoidance of potential military action, 
prevention is sometimes pushed to the margins likely because it requires long-term planning and 
a willingness to engage prior to a newsworthy crisis.  A greater understanding of how mass 
killing comes to be might enhance the international community’s ability to practice targeted, 
effective prevention and, ultimately, save lives. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Author’s Note: I thank the following individuals for their guidance, in various capacities, during the construction of 
this paper: Scott Kirsch, Patricia Sullivan, Daniel Solomon, Erin Murphy, Danny Hirschel-Burns, Shomya Tripathy, 
Hannah Finnie, Shannon Steel, and Jason Langberg. 
2 Caramia, Giuseppe. "The twentieth century: The century of progress and medicine." Journal of Maternal-Fetal and 
Neonatal Medicine. 19.6 (2006): 317-322. 
	  5 
This paper’s scope is social-scientific and policy-oriented.  The study of mass killing is 
inherently multidisciplinary and has the potential to include psychology, economics, linguistics, 
and anthropology, among others.  However, due to inevitable limitations, the paper will focus 
most on the politico-scientific and geographical lenses through which to view mass killing while 
remaining under the umbrellas of conflict studies and international relations.  This selection is 
intentional in order to best understand the primary and secondary drivers of mass killing rather 
than tertiary ones, however important.  It is also to keep the paper as relevant to policy as 
possible.  Understanding ontology for research purposes is useful, but applying the lessons to 
tangible prevention and response policy is more important.   
The three chosen lenses aim to expand the relatively limited discursive canon by 
exploring the “why” questions of mass killing rather than only the “how” questions, especially 
how global and regional changes can have local consequences.  Typically, the emphasis on the 
processes of mass killing, especially since the inception of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, 
skews political action toward response rather than prevention.   
One of the primary ways the paper will challenge many of the conventional conceptions 
of mass killing is through geographic analysis.  Geography is an underrepresented discipline in 
the multidisciplinary literature despite the inherent geographic nature of mass killing episodes; 
violence often follows predictable spatial patterns, especially in dense areas.  Geographic 
indicators such as natural resource locations, terrain, and distance from urban centers can aid 
international prevention efforts and begin to “untangle webs of territory, identity and power.”3 
The first chapter of the paper reviews literature about political violence, dominant 
theories, and conflict dynamics.  The second chapter outlines a systems-level schematic of mass 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 O'Lear, Shannon, and Stephen Egbert. "Introduction: Geographies of Genocide." Space and Polity. 13.1 (2009): 1. 
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killing that attempts to address some of the gaps within the literature.  The third chapter tests 
how it could work using the Second Congo War assesses the schematic’s broader applicability.  
The conclusion discusses potential policy implications, particularly regarding mass killing 
prevention and lists areas for further research. 
Defining Mass Killing 
In the following analysis, I intentionally use the term “mass killing” instead of “mass 
atrocities,” a popular alternative.  In a paper about the ontology of mass killing, defining the 
phenomenon is an essential yet difficult task.  What makes an episode “massive” versus just 
killing?  What makes an action killing versus simply dying?  What makes mass killing different 
than lesser political violence?  These three questions shape how this paper, and presumably 
others,4 conceptualizes what mass killing means and how it comes to be.  Clearly defining mass 
killing is also important because different types of killing require different types of prediction, 
analysis, and policy response, with genocide being the outlier. 
First, the “mass” qualifier in “mass killing” is meant primarily to convey a numerical 
threshold.  For many experts, massive means 500-1000 people killed.5  A key departure between 
my definition of mass killing and other definitions of mass atrocities, is that it does not include 
secondary causes of death such as famine and does not include rape, another common 
component of war that some argue should be included.  This distinction does not minimize the 
gravity of those events, but simply clarifies the specific phenomena the following sections refer 
to.  While the numerical threshold tends to cause more problems than it solves, especially for 
qualitative researchers, it is required to understand the uniqueness of mass killing.  Generally, the 
threshold is relatively high which is the most meaningful criteria.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Solomon, Daniel. "The Four Dilemmas of a Mass Atrocity." Securing Rights. 22 Aug 2013. 
5 Ulfeldler, Jay, and Benjamin Valentino. "Assessing Risks of State-Sponsored Mass Killing." Political Instability 
Task Force, Feb 2008. 
	  7 
Second, the “killing” is included to make a rhetorical differentiation from “atrocities.” 
Primarily this is meant to remove some moral judgments that could color analyses and to 
establish the intentionality of mass killing.  Often it is the case during mass killing that the two or 
more sides are not morally equivalent.  This lack of equivalence, however, should not bias the 
search for ontological answers, though tempting in extreme cases.  Perpetrators and victims are 
rarely static or monolithic categories;6 power asymmetries that contribute to mass killing are 
situationally dependent and can shift over the course of an episode making moral judgments 
subject to change.  The war in Syria provides is an example of a conflict where one side, the 
Assad regime, is widely considered to be morally bankrupt, creating an understandable impulse 
to support his opposition. However, as the nature of the opposition has become more radical and 
their willingness to kill has increased,7 the moral calculus has shifted from a bright boundary 
between Assad and the opposition to a blurred one.  
The last question - what distinguishes mass killing from other kinds of political violence - 
is a vexing one that will be addressed throughout the paper.  Some see the numerical threshold 
discussed above as the primary distinction, but there is more.  The means of killing, networks 
involved, causes, responses, and outcomes are truly unique.  In order to adequately reach creative 
conclusions about the ontology of mass killing this uniqueness must be a primary consideration.  
Also, as is the case with civil wars, mass killing episodes are almost always an 
aggregation of individual attacks.  In rare cases such as the September 2013 chemical weapons 
attack near Damascus, a single event may surpass the mass killing threshold.8  As Stanton puts it, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Luft, Aliza. "Not Just Victims and Perpetrators: Understanding Rwanda’s Genocide, Twenty Years-On." Political 
Violence @ A Glance. 9 Apr 2014.  
7 "Syrian Opposition Fighters Killed At Least 190 Civilians In Brutal Assault, Human Rights Watch Says." The 
World Post. The Huffington Post, 11 Oct 2013. 
8 McDonnell, Patrick. "Syria meets chemical weapons deadline." Los Angeles Times, 27 Oct 2013.  
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“the crime of genocide...does not exist apart from [genocidal] acts.”9  Solomon calls this 
aggregation “meta- events” with examples being the “Rwandan genocide” and “Kenya’s election 
violence.”    
Finally, the concrete definition of mass killing I will use, if one is truly necessary, is this: 
mass killing is the widespread, intentional killing of noncombatants by state or non-state actors.  
Quantitatively, the scale of death must be 1,000 noncombatants in a twelve-month span.  For this 
paper, “civilian” is synonymous with “noncombatant,” defined as any unarmed person who is 
not a member of a state or non-state armed group and who does not actively participate in 
hostilities intended to cause physical harm to enemy personnel or property.10   
This distinction - combatant versus noncombatant - is important when discussing mass 
killing for two reasons.  First, unconventional warfare creates a blurred boundary between 
noncombatants and combatants because of the fluid relationship between armed groups and 
civilians.  Civilians can enter and exit armed groups more easily than a conventional army.  As a 
result, it is important to clarify who is fighting and who is not, especially if governments or 
armed groups attempt to unilaterally classify civilians as combatants or sympathizers.  Second, 
civilians occupy a unique space in the mass killing system.  They can provide safe havens, 
enable armed groups, take up arms, or act as agents of change and peace.11  These roles make 
clarifying who is interested in peace, or merely a bystander, important for prevention and 
response purposes.   
 Finally, with this definition in mind, it is important to place mass killing episodes in their 
proper geographic context.  Mass killing, as with most political violence, happens at multiple 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Stanton, Gregory. "The 8 Stages of Genocide." Genocide Watch. 
10 Valentino, Benjamin, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay. "Draining the Sea”: Mass Killing and Guerrilla 
Warfare." International Organizations. 58.2 (2004): 378-9. 
11 Ibid., p. 379 
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interlocking scales.12  What may seem like an isolated attack on civilians in rural Uganda is 
affected by regional, national, and international politics and policy.  Global changes might have 
local consequences and local changes, when aggregated, might have global consequences.  
Exploring the ontology of mass killing requires taking a close look at all of the scales of conflict.  
Why does it happen in some places and not others?  Why does most modern mass killing happen 
in the Global South?  Do certain spaces make political violence go from bad to genocidal?  
Ultimately, these questions lead to the primary inquiry: How does mass killing come to be? 
Chapter 1: Reviewing the Literature 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces some seminal works in the modern mass killing canon.  From the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine to Ulfelder’s statistical prediction modeling, the literature is 
diverse and multidisciplinary.  The first portion reviews general prevention and response work, 
the two broad categories of research and policy.  It then turns to critical concepts within the 
literature including ontological theories and attempts to identify potential gaps.  It concludes with 
a discussion of the geographical components of mass killing. 
Section 1: Studies and Foundations of Mass Killing Prevention and Response 
 The literature about mass killing is relatively new, mostly emerging shortly after the 
Second World War as policymakers attempted to grapple with the horrors of the Holocaust and 
other wartime episodes of extreme violence.  As with other collective thought projects about the 
Holocaust, research about mass killing largely subsided during most of the Cold War.  It made 
brief appearances during the Six Day War in 1967, Vietnam War,13 and 1970s as the American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See O’Lear et al. (2009), p. 6 
13 Klinghoffer, Judith Apter. "The Transformation of the Holocaust Legacy." Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of 
Jewish Studies. 14.2 (1996): 1.  
	  10 
Jewry embraced Holocaust remembrance,14 but remained a relatively marginal topic of academic 
inquiry until post-Cold War conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda.15   
At that point, the study of mass killing became relevant for academics and policymakers 
alike.  Pragmatic policy questions about how to respond to violence like that in Sarajevo and 
Kigali and how to prevent the next episode found a niche within the foreign policy research 
community.  The Rwandan genocide caused further specialization into genocide studies.  While 
the majority of formal thought about genocide prior to 1994 dealt with issues of the Holocaust, 
Rwanda provided a landmark case study for modernizing the field.  Genocide studies received 
another lift as Omar al-Bashir launched an assault on Darfur in the mid-2000s.  Despite having 
the fewest episodes, relative to mass atrocities or other forms of mass killing, genocide occupies 
disproportionate space likely because of its unique position in a collective moral conscience. 16  
Mass atrocity literature follows a similar pattern to the mass killing literature, but the 
term has entered the foreign policy community’s vernacular on a wide scale over the past decade 
possibly because Gareth Evans, co-creator of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) doctrine, 
widely uses the term.17  Moreover, “mass atrocities” is seen as a more accurate way of describing 
episodes of violence in the context of intrastate wars that do not reach the scale of genocide.  
While some pieces distinguishe between mass atrocities and the more legalistic “crimes against 
humanity,”18 “war crimes,” and “ethnic cleansing,” most of the post-2001 literature uses the 
umbrella term “mass atrocities” or “mass atrocity crimes.”   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Langer, Lawrence. "A Sacred Evil." The New York Times. 27 Jun 1999.  
15 Straus, Scott. "‘‘Destroy Them to Save Us’’: Theories of Genocide and the Logics of Political Violence." 
Terrorism and Political Violence. 24. (2012): 554-5.  
16 Power, Samantha. "The World's Most Unfulfilled Promise." Frontline. PBS.  
17 Evans, Gareth. "Remarks from Former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Gareth Evans: Responding to Mass 
Atrocity Crimes: The “Responsibility to Protect” After Libya." International Coalition for the Responsibility to 
Protect. 6 October 2012.  
18 "Enablers of Mass Atrocities?: What Companies Should Know and Do About the Risks of Contributing to the 
World’s Worst Crimes." Human Rights First.  
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The novelty of the literature about mass killing means that it appears in a disparate array 
of sources, particularly academic blogs and think tanks.  Some of the most influential pieces, 
particularly the ones that respond to rapidly changing conditions on the ground or propose 
radical shifts in thinking, initially appear on academic and organizational blogs because they 
garner a broad readership and the content addresses contemporary policy challenges.19   
 The general literature about mass killing displays two major empirical and theoretical 
themes that could be considered flaws.  First, it is skewed toward understanding Northwestern 
response to mass killing instead of prevention.  Despite a widespread desire to prevent the next 
episode, a disproportionate amount of the literature exclusively focuses on reactive actions that 
can be taken, often called “tools in the toolbox.”20  This disproportionality also exists in foreign 
policy discourse outside of the literature.  Despite the widely cited fact that conflict prevention is 
potentially 60 times cheaper than war,21 seemingly making prevention a pragmatic policy pitch, 
response dominates the conversation.  
 The Responsibility to Protect doctrine was created and approved in the early 2000s in an 
attempt to establish a comprehensive plan for action regarding mass killing and to create a norm 
of human rights-based international security.22  It has quickly become a hegemonic idea within 
the Northwestern mass killing response community.  The premise of the doctrine centers around 
three responsibilities - to prevent conflict, respond to outbreaks of violence, and rebuild after 
conflict ends.23  Despite the report’s plausible and creative prevention and rebuilding strategies, 
policy discourse and academic research remains heavily focused on responses to mass killing.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Solomon, Daniel. "The Four Dilemmas of a Mass Atrocity." Securing Rights. 22 Aug 2013. 
20 "A Toolbox for Preventing Genocide." Transitional Justice. Facing History and Ourselves. 
21 "Preventing war is 60 times cheaper than fighting it." Friends Committee on National Legislation.  
22 Evans, Gareth, and Mohamed Sahnoun, eds. "The Responsibility to Protect." International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001.  
23 Ibid., p. xi 
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As a result, broader mass killing policy agendas are delayed to the point where prevention 
becomes irrelevant or blurs into humanitarian relief.   
The emphasis on response analysis can be found in major works such as Sewell, 
Raymond, and Chin’s “Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook,”24 a 
landmark piece outlining U.S. Army strategy during interventions.  It is also found elsewhere 
such as Evans’ The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All,25 
and Waxman’s “Intervention to Stop Genocide and Mass Atrocities”26 among many others.  
Another way of framing response is through the language of intervention.  The NATO bombings 
in Bosnia in 1995 were seen as ushering in a “new era” of internationalism and reliance on force 
to stop killing.27  The literature continues this theme by framing intervention in terms of 
humanitarianism despite the fact that it is often driven by realist geopolitics.   
Moreover, intervention is often perceived as a prevention strategy simply because 
military force stops more widespread killing.  In Bosnia, the sluggish response came after Serbs 
attacked and killed over 7,000 civilians in Srebrenica, yet some attribute the signing of the 
Dayton Accords, and therefore the prevention of future killing, to the intervention.28  Other 
pieces see prevention as wholly occurring before mass killing begins and exclusively through 
nonviolent means.  Bennett et al. categorize these strategies into systemic and direct 
prevention.29  The “intervention as prevention” rationale can be seen in contemporary discursive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Sewell, Stacy, Dwight Raymond, and Sally Chin. "Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning 
Handbook." Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, 2010. 
25 Evans, Gareth. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All. Washington D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 2008.  
26 Waxman, Matthew. "Intervention to Stop Genocide and Mass Atrocities." Council on Foreign Relations, Oct 2009. 
27 Talentino, Andrea Kathryn. Military Intervention After the Cold War: The Evolution of Theory and Practice. 
Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005. 199. 
28 Ibid, p.188 
29 Bennett, Andrew, et al. "Strategies and Tools for Preventing Mass Atrocities: Insights from Historical Cases." 
Political Instability Task Force, 27 Jul 2012. 15-29. 
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debates.  In a March 2011 speech on intervention in Libya, President Obama said “In just one 
month, the United States has worked with our international partners to...protect 
civilians...prevent a massacre, and establish a no-fly zone.”30  In a July 2012 speech at the United 
States Holocaust Museum, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “When the Gaddafi 
regime threatened a massacre in the city of Benghazi, [the U.S.] forged an international coalition 
to stop the assault.”31  The administration supported these comments using the “responsibility” 
rhetoric of RtoP.   
The second commonality evident in general mass killing literature is an empirical one; 
there is a widespread tendency to focus on a limited selection of case studies.  The Holocaust, 
Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Sudan, and, to a lesser extent, Armenia are the most examined 
episodes of mass killing; often cases of genocide are prioritized over other instances of mass 
killing despite numerous datasets such as Ulfelder and Valentino’s which lists 120 episodes of 
mass killing events worldwide from 1945-2006 using a threshold of 1,000 noncombatant deaths 
in a period of sustained violence.32  Bellamy’s 2011 dataset lists 103 episodes mass atrocities and 
armed conflict from 1945-2010 using a threshold of 5,000 deaths.33  Cases common in these 
expanded lists include well-known ones such as Burma as well as those rarely mentioned in the 
literature such as Romania, Tajikistan, and Nepal.   
There is value in analyzing a broader range of case studies.  First, it ensures that 
conceptualizations of mass killing are more generalizable.  Case studies, particularly qualitative 
ones, inherently exist in isolation despite functioning in an open system.  If conflict theories are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 "Obama's Speech On Libya: 'A Responsibility To Act'." National Public Radio, 28 Mar 2011. 
31 Clinton, Hillary. "Remarks at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Forward-Looking Symposium on Genocide 
Prevention." U.S. Department of State, 24 Jul 2012.  
32 Ulfeldler, Jay, and Benjamin Valentino. "Assessing Risks of State-Sponsored Mass Killing." Political Instability 
Task Force, Feb 2008. 
33 Bellamy, Alex. "Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the Responsibility 
to Prevent." Stanley Foundation, Feb 2011. 
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to be applicable outside of a particular region or country they must either include a broad range 
of episodes or acknowledge empirical gaps.  The emphasis on the Holocaust, Bosnia, and 
Rwanda is not haphazard; these cases are extreme instances of violence that garnered significant 
international attention and caused some type of intervention.  As is shown above, those 
characteristics seem to make for more morally appealing and actionable analysis than smaller 
scale episodes.  For instance, Scherrer’s 1999 theory of a modern genocide, proposes a “scale of 
degree of variability” for cases of mass killing from mass murder to full-scale genocide, but he 
focuses on the latter cases - Armenia, Holocaust, Cambodia, Rwanda - and simply lists others.34   
The second advantage of focusing on a wider array of case studies is that it begins to 
make the analytical transition away from genocide toward the broader concept of mass killing.  
The moral outrages that genocides cause are unparalleled, but they are rare because of a 
deliberately exclusive definition.  Mass killing at-large is more common historically and today - 
typically considered over 100 cases since 194535 - and therefore lends itself to relevant 
contemporary policy discussions.  Also, the uniqueness of genocide means that how it begins, 
sustains itself, and ends is also unique and, as a result, genocide analysis is often not applicable 
to pressing mass killing crises.  For instance, frameworks such as Campbell’s Weberian ideal-
type classification looks at unique processes of social control, via pure psychology, that might 
contribute to the onset of genocide.36  However those processes are less often applicable to lesser 
forms of mass killing.   
  The literature is beginning to make a transition.  Mass atrocities and mass killing are 
becoming more popular in multiple spheres of discourse.  Staub distinguishes between mass 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Scherrer, Christian. "Towards a theory of modern genocide. Comparative genocide research: definitions, criteria, 
typologies, cases, key elements, patterns and voids." Journal of Genocide Research. 1.1 (1999): 18-22.  
35 See Ulfelder and Valentino; Bellamy datasets (2008; 2011) 
36 Campbell, Bradley. "Genocide as a matter of degree." British Journal of Sociology. 62.4 (2011). 
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killing and genocide in his analysis of the psychology of violence;37 Fjelde and Hultman call 
episodes “civilian atrocities” as they parse out the role of ethnicity,38 a topic that typically lends 
itself to genocide cases.  In the non-academic literature, Ulfelder’s and Valentino’s work uses 
mass killing datasets; Bellamy’s Stanley Foundation reports feature cases of mass atrocities; and, 
in a landmark move, the Obama administration created the Atrocities Prevention Board, an 
executive-level interagency panel charged with developing long-term strategy.39  
The transition is a bottom-up and top-down one.  The Responsibility to Protect is 
changing the way experts and advocates talk about mass killing by focusing on cases other than 
genocide.  Simultaneously, the context of mass killing continues to shift from peacetime to 
wartime.40  Wartime “atrocities” are a departure from popular conceptions of mass killing such 
as concentration camps in Europe or torture centers in Cambodia.  Mass killing in places such as 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sri Lanka, and Nigeria now deserve attention.  In turn, these 
changes to conflict, in non-theoretical terms, cause the literature to shift away from genocide 
discourse.   
Section 2: Critical Concepts and Theoretical Gaps in the Mass Killing Literature 
Political violence provides the context for modern mass killing.  Before the 1980s, killing 
on the largest scales could happen as despotic leaders attempted to make and remake states - 
Young Turks of Armenia, Hitler of Germany, Zedong of China, Stalin of Russia, Pol Pot of 
Cambodia, and so on.41  However, wartime atrocities look somewhat different.  During the 	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38 Fjelde, Hanne, and Lisa Hultman. "Weakening the Enemy: A Disaggregated Study of Violence against Civilians 
in Africa." Journal of Conflict Resolution. 00.0 (2013): 1-28.  
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decade prior to the fall of the Soviet Union political violence opened space for killing and 
continues to do so.  Therefore, understanding the ontology of mass killing means understanding 
the ontology of political violence.   
Dumouchel asks an important definitional question - how and why is political violence 
different from a bar brawl?  His answer is straightforward - “political violence is committed in 
the context of political conflict, or that can be related, either through its cause or through its 
motive, to political motives.”42  However, as he notes, the last clause means that almost any 
violence can feasibly be considered political violence.   
Mars provides a more specific definition consisting of six components - activities must be 
carried out by a group or collective movement; activities must be organized as opposed to 
spontaneous; activities challenge the legitimacy of the governing regime or political system; 
activities must be directed toward the governing regime or political system; activities that will 
likely cause a coercive reaction from the governing regime; and activities must involve a high 
degree of risk of in to the participants and opponents of political violence.43  However, this does 
not cover political violence that is not directed at regimes or decentralized political systems.  
Secondary and tertiary goals of political violence may be directed toward civilians or other 
armed groups in order to establish a hegemony over regime resistance narratives.44  Hibbs’ mass 
political violence concept is useful with regards to mass killing.  His taxonomy of mass political 
violence includes “armed attack events” which could include all mass killing episodes.45   
 Kalyvas develops a compelling theory that highlights the complexity and ambiguity of 	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political violence while analyzing the processes of civil wars.  In a political geographic sense, 
Kalyvas includes conflict’s driving, or “master,” cleavage and local disputes in the list of war’s 
causes.46  Furthermore, he notes that local, or “private” actors can use the war to settle conflicts 
that have little relation to the master cleavage.47  These points of analysis lead him to question 
whether all violence that occurs during civil wars is actually political violence.  Similarly, it is 
plausible to assume that not all political violence that happens during episodes of mass killing, a 
meta-event, is connected to the master cleavage and therefore is not political violence.  As 
Kalyvas notes, this debunks conceptions of binary civil wars, or two sides fighting each other.  
Rather there are a myriad of actors - local, regional, national - operating under the umbrella of a 
master cleavage, but with differing motives.48   
 This paper will use a conception of political violence that resembles Dumouchel’s, Mars’, 
and Kalyvas’.  A definition with limited constraints on what can be considered political violence, 
yet includes clear component is necessary because not all killing is political, but all mass killing 
is.  Moreover, the complexity and ambiguity of Kalyvas’ civil war theory has important 
implications for mass killing theories because, as meta-events, mass killing episodes are 
inherently diverse and multi-faceted.  Due to the complexity, the ontology of political violence is 
clearly unclear, beyond a few minor definitional boundaries that make the ontology of mass 
killing equally ambiguous.   
There is a wide variety of theories about how and why mass killing begins and sustains 
itself: Krain’s political opportunity structure,49 Staub’s hardship and structuralism thesis,50 
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Bauman’s modernity principle,51 Rummel’s lack of cross-cutting cleavages,52 and so on.   In 
order to explore the literature’s understanding, explanations of genocide are an essential first step 
because they are widely available.  Stanton’s framework provides one of the most common ways 
that advocacy organizations, especially ones with a degree of emphasis on prevention, 
understand genocide.  Stanton says there are eight stages of genocide - classification, 
symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination, and 
denial.   
Cases such as the Holocaust, Rwanda, and potentially Burma are compelling instances 
that illustrate a stepwise process.  Stanton is careful to point out the often ignored “or in part” 
clause of the U.N.’s definition of genocide, presumably in an attempt to expand his framework.53  
However, a post on Genocide Watch,54 Stanton’s organization, compares violence in Syria to 
genocide.  It goes on to clumsily fit the Syrian civil war into the eight step framework.  Whether 
Syria’s “massacres have become genocidal” or not, the post shows that genocide theories often 
cannot be applied to other forms of mass killing.   
The popularity of Stanton’s stages indicates that a stepwise conception of mass killing 
has broad appeal.  The literature’s tendency to develop categorizations, stages, taxonomies, and 
typologies is understandable, especially considering the complexity of meta-events.  However, a 
stepwise process often does not provide an adequate lens through which to view mass killing, 
partially because it pervades a teleological understanding of conflict.   
Aristotle understood biology to be teleological - people go from being eggs to adults and 
even the universe will someday end.  However, Bacon and Descartes rightly advocated for an 	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end to teleological language, even for human behavior, because they believed that life did not 
end at adulthood and human behavior is always evolving.55  A similar idea applies to mass 
killing.  de Waal, Meierhenrich, and Conley-Zilkic outline the common understanding when they 
write the “ teleological assumption that the occurrence of attacks against civilians will, unless 
halted or deterred from outside, inevitably escalate towards genocide.”56  They attribute this 
assumption to the hyper-focus on the Holocaust and Rwandan genocide.  In both cases, mass 
killing ended with a forceful overthrow of the regime, nicely fitting into Stanton’s teleological 
model.  What they call “essentialist logic of violence” implies that “perpetrators are seen as 
desiring the destruction of the target group more than anything else.”  McDoom proposes an 
analytical alternative - genocide, and other forms of mass killing, should be conceptualized as a 
continuous process rather than a discrete event.57  This is similar to Solomon’s aggregation and 
meta-event idea;58 mass killing is not a single event, but a series of killings that, when taken in 
sum, form a discernable whole.   
There are several tangible policy implications for having teleological and non-
teleological perspectives.  If teleological, policy debates simply revolve around when to 
intervene and end the violence processes.  In Libya, for instance, 2011’s “Unified Protector” 
only came about as hate speech emerged from the Royal Palace and it became clear that the 
opposition was not going to overthrow Gaddafi.59  Moreover, after Gaddafi was murdered, the 
international coalition quickly disengaged because the conflict was seen to have reached its end.  	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In reality, violence and instability continues in different forms in different spaces across Libya.  
de Waal et al. attribute the over-reliance on military intervention, rhetorically referred to as 
humanitarian intervention, to this type of teleological policy thinking.60 
By waiting for a “stage” that immediately precedes or follows a mass killing event, 
policymakers leave themselves few options other than military intervention.  This is reflected in 
the international community’s reception and utilization of the Responsibility to Protect and the 
high level Genocide Prevention Task Force report61.  The focus is heavily on the military 
intervention component because it provides an easy and moral sounding rationale - intervening 
in mass killing processes will stop the inevitable march to high death tolls.  In reality, 
international coalitions get involved in non-linear conflicts that do not follow a model ending in 
peace. 
Most recently, this played out regarding Syria with the Obama administration’s “red line.”  
The only conflict development significant enough to solicit significant bureaucratic movement, 
was the use of chemical weapons.62  Despite lackluster attempts at a negotiated settlement and 
the Russian government’s steadfast support of Bashar al-Assad, the Obama administration 
proposed a plan to bomb Syria in October 2013. There was little talk earlier in 2013 about other 
preventative action that could be taken; the debate was solely about when to intervene.  
Ultimately, only a last minute multilateral weapons deal stopped the bombing.   
Other analysts are developing more complex frameworks.  For instance, the Sentinel 
Project for Genocide Prevention has developed a “risk factor list” which they divide into four 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See de Waal et al.’s “How Mass Atrocities End: An Evidence-Based Counter-Narrative” 
61 Albright, Madeleine, and William Cohen, eds. "Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers." United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1 Jan 2008.  
62 Price, Richard. "No Strike, No Problem: The Right Way to Nurture a Norm." Foreign Affairs. 5 Sep 2013.  
	  21 
categories - political, economic, sociocultural, and conflict and upheaval.63  Some of the factors 
it includes are common ones such as degree of political freedom and economic status of the 
ruling regime, but others are less common.  Whether or not the outgroup, or persecuted people, is 
viewed as an obstacle to economic progress is an important consideration when analyzing the 
risk of mass killing.  That risk factor does not necessarily fit into one of Stanton’s stages, but 
plays a major role in how some conflicts, such as Darfur, develop.   
Clearly, some of the Sentinel Project’s risk factors will matter more in different countries.  
For instance, the economic status of the Assad regime likely affects the degree to which the 
Syrian military attacks civilians whereas in Burma, the degree of speech and press freedom 
largely determines the ability of ethnic minorities to express grievances.64  Certainly, Stanton’s 
stages and the Sentinel Project’s risk factors differ in many ways - notably exclusively genocide 
versus genocide and mass atrocities - but both have a goal of prevention and, therefore, are 
comparable.   
The two systems along with many others such as Ulfelder and Valentino’s65 and Straus’66 
try to understand human interactions through categorical systems - a noble and common goal of 
academia.  This systemization mirrors an important and often repeated trope in the literature - 
killing is logical.  The horrors of the worst conflicts often seem senseless and often are called so 
in non-academic literature.  However, upon further examination, all killing functions based on 
various logics.  The torchbearer of this position is Benjamin Valentino, but there are many others 
such as DeMeritt67 and Chirot and McCauley.68 
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Valentino’s compelling premise begins by challenging the plural society theory, a major 
theme in the mass killing literature.  The theory states that deep divisions between different 
groups living in the same society are a central cause of killing, particularly genocide.  The theory, 
popularized by Leo Kuper, primarily focuses on political, ethnic, cultural, religious, and other 
forms of de facto discrimination that lead to prejudice based on those divisions.69  As Valentino 
notes, other scholars believe those social divisions polarize society to such a high degree that 
they cause mass killing.   
While social divisions certainly play a role in the onset of mass killing, Valentino argues 
that there is little evidence that social cleavages are “more intense in societies that have 
experienced genocide or mass killing than in those that have not.”70  Mass killing in the Soviet 
Union, China, and Cambodia supports the argument because members of the same class and 
ethnic group killed each other, not necessarily because of any specific social cleavage.71  This 
goes against much a dominant strain of media coverage of recent conflicts such as those in 
Darfur (Arab vs. “Black African”), Southwest Asia (Sunni vs. Shia), and across sub-Saharan 
Africa (Christian vs. Muslim) where the main conflict driver is thought to be the deep social 
divisions presented in the plural society theory.  Valentino also contests other common threads in 
the literature such as the scapegoat theory, common in Holocaust studies, and the causal 
relationship between national crises, political opportunity spaces, and mass killing.72  Ulfelder 
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supports a similar idea about elections’ capacity for triggering killing.73 
Valentino’s alternative is an elite-driven theory.  Many of the approaches outlined above 
rely on an understanding that mass killing campaigns depend on the support of larger societies; 
mass killing is a type of contract between elites and perpetrators to conspire against a 
marginalized group.  Instead, Valentino says mass killing is initiated by a small group of elites in 
particular political situations.74  Initiating killing is not a first resort, but it is also not always a 
last resort; it depends on the situational logics.  Leaders might consider whether the killing will 
accomplish their goals - to eliminate a population in the case of genocide, or crush dissent, in 
many other mass killing cases.   
In his typological analysis, Valentino identifies six motives - communist, ethnic, 
territorial, counterguerilla, terrorist, and imperialist.75  The ethnic, territorial, counterguerrilla, 
and terrorist motives are arguably most relevant to conflicts in the 21st century.  A terrorist 
motive, despite having a few unique analytical factors, is much like a counterguerrilla motive 
with inverse logics.  The book’s Guatemala and Afghanistan case studies are the most useful for 
determining the ontology of mass killing in non-genocidal cases because they are representative 
of modern conflicts that pit a fragile state against opposition groups.  While the logics of each of 
these categories varies, the central contention remains - mass killing is situationally dependent 
and driven by elite actors.   
Demerit's work supports the logical killing idea, specifically when a government decides 
to kill its citizens.  Her foundational question is similar to Valentino’s - if the conditions and 
incentives to kill are found in a wide variety of places, why do only some result in mass killing, 	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and further, why are some more deadly than others?  Her game-theoretic model shows that death 
tolls are determined in part by the communicative processes that occur between elites and 
perpetrators; what elites ask, perpetrators will do.76  Again, this logic-based theory goes against, 
if not explicitly, the idea that mass killing campaigns rely on larger societies.  Demeritt says that 
“one-sided killing is a policy option that brings the government closer to a political or military 
objective”77 with similar reasoning applying to non-state perpetrators.  This idea does not rest on 
a theory of deeply divided societies that are transformed into masses willing to exploit ethnic or 
other differences.   
Finally, understandings of the geography of mass killing are chronically under-addressed 
in the literature.  There are two initial geographic aspects of mass killing studies worth noting - 
physical location of violence and how location affects the severity and longevity of conflict.  
McDoom understands mass killing as a kind of disease; he thinks violence is contagious and that 
“violence is endogenous to itself.”78  He goes further by saying violence spreads in spatially 
adjacent areas.  McDoom’s case study, Rwanda, almost certainly confirms his idea.  Violence 
diffused throughout the country, albeit unevenly, in just over 100 days.  However, the wider 
applicability of a contagion concept, especially in cases other than genocide, is problematic 
because violence may not operate strictly in adjacent areas in other cases of mass killing.   
In a different capacity, Buhaug et al. investigate the relationship between geography and 
the duration of civil conflicts, which make up most modern mass killing episodes.  They found 
that conflicts occurring at great distances from the government stronghold, typically a country’s 
or region’s capital, and conflicts along international borders, particularly near natural resources, 	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last longer.79  Conflicts in Burma and Togo, respectively, illustrate this difference. They also 
posit that the strength of opposition forces in remote areas affects the longevity of conflict; a 
very weak or very strong force near a government center contributes to a shorter conflict while a 
relatively evenly matched force in a remote area contributes to a longer conflict.  They offer a 
broader principle called “geographic opportunities” meaning that “conflicts in areas favorable to 
guerrilla warfare last longer”80 and will presumably wreak more havoc on civilians.  As a 
corollary, they underscore Boulding’s loss of strength concept - power decays as it is projected 
across larger spaces.81   
The Holocaust, a mechanized killing episode, presents an opposite logic in some ways 
because of the fact that almost all violence was state-led.  In the early part of the war, 
Einsatzgruppen killing initially took place in towns and cities located on the main highways; 
death squads could reach those places most easily which made them easy targets.82  Boulding’s 
principle remained true in an inverse way as it applied to Buhaug et al. because military power 
originated from the state rather than disparate opposition centers.  Later in the war, the squads 
diffused throughout the Soviet Union’s rural areas.  
The concept of space also plays an especially important role in understanding mass 
killing. Tyner’s 2008 book, The Killing of Cambodia, inverts Lefebvre’s conventional 
understanding that spaces are produced by saying that the Khmer Rouge attempted to erase 
spaces; the regime wanted to take spaces shaped by indigenous society and French colonialism 
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and rewrite them according to a new narrative of state-centric progress.83   
Internment and isolation are nefarious spatial tactics seen throughout the history of mass 
killing, particularly during genocides.  Jews were transported to concentration and extermination 
camps from Jewish ghettos, another distinct space, to be killed and contained.  The U.S. 
government’s campaign against Native Americans provides a particularly interesting example of 
spatialized mass killing.  Not only was state policy to kill natives whenever necessary, but it also 
implemented a far-reaching forced relocation program, gruesomely illustrated by the Trail of 
Tears massacre.84  The result was a reserve system, a lasting form of spatial isolation, similar to 
apartheid-era South African townships.   
The plural society theory discussed above also often has a spatial component, if not 
always recognized.  Iraq is a case that could feasibly fall under the theory’s premise that deeply 
divided societies are a precursor to mass killing.  Commonly, the current violence there is 
attributed to ancient, or at least historical, religious feuds between Muslim sects.  Kurds live in 
the north, Sunnis in the center, and Shia in the southeast, roughly.85  The plural society theory 
would rightly assume that violence primarily occurs in the central northern area where Sunnis 
and Shia live together.86  However, spatiality and social divisions cannot stand alone.  Other 
factors such as the power of urban areas in the region and the U.S. invasion and occupation are 
relevant considerations.  The area provides several geographic opportunities - it contains the 
national capital, high visibility of occupying forces, and so on.   
Finally, the spatiality of mass killing explicitly plays out in a policy sense during conflict 	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resolution efforts.  Partition is one of the primary outcomes that domestic and international 
policymakers seek when facing secessionist movements, particularly in what is perceived to be a 
deeply divided society.  From 1900-1996, 42 states became independent through partition with 
South Sudan joining the group in 2011.87  It is worth noting that only a handful of these cases 
occurred after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, either indicating that it will be a less 
common outcome in the future or that partitions come in waves as results of major geopolitical 
changes.  Partitions offer limited empirical evidence about the ontology of mass killing, but the 
international community’s tendency to resort to them offers insight into what it is perceived to be.  
The logic of partition is to separate two or more groups because there is not a feasible scenario in 
which they could coexist; one aspect of identity, whether it is ethnicity, religion, or something 
else, overrides all other benefits of unified statehood.  It is largely essentialist logic with imposed 
geographic consequences that often does little to solve long-term conflict.88 
Conclusion 
This chapter introduced a portion of the mass killing literature that aims to answer difficult 
questions regarding how mass killing begins.  It discussed some conventional ways of viewing 
mass killing such as Stanton’s stages and potential shortcomings of those approaches.  It also 
included a discussion of Valentino’s typology of political violence that informs the contexts in 
which mass killing occurs.  A concern about the potential of oversimplification of conflicts 
emerged.  The next chapter introduces geographic complex adaptive systems as an analytical tool. 
Chapter 2: Theorizing the Ontology of Mass Killing 
Introduction 	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This chapter begins with a discussion of risk factor lists, one of the dominant ways that analysts 
use to pinpoint where mass killing will occur.  The discussion includes some potential 
weaknesses of those lists particularly in the context of targeted prevention.  The chapter then 
turns to complex adaptive systems and related key concepts such as strength and strain, 
subsystems, and delays.  It also outlines many of the components needed to apply complex 
adaptive systems to conflict.  The final section discusses geographies of power as a concept and 
illustrates how they can bolster ontological analysis. 
Section 1: Potential Limitations of Risk Factor Lists89 
The gaps and insufficiencies of the conceptions outlined in the previous chapter highlight 
the urgency of charting different courses for the understanding of mass killing.  In order to begin 
this enterprise it is worth exploring the roots of the dominant literature.  Many of the 
conventional ways of thinking about mass killing are founded upon modern analytical 
assumptions.90  These assumptions include cause-and-effect relationships, wholes can be 
understood by analyzing parts, and that knowledge of the past will always create the capacity for 
prevention.  These principles are said to be “so deeply embedded in these cultures' education and 
worldview, that one is not even generally aware of them.”91  As a result, social sciences 
notoriously struggle to grasp the complexity, adaptability, and intangibility of human systems.   
This tension is evident in the historiography of scientific research spaces.  The perhaps 
unwarranted binary between “the laboratory” and “the field” shows that some spaces of 
knowledge are considered controlled and some wild, even chaotic.  For Keith Richards, a natural 
scientist, the site of social sciences is the laboratory “‘out there’ in the world, uncontrolled, even 
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uncontrollable” while physical sciences “define their own rules” and “narrow the field of view, 
and allow deliberate exercise of control to facilitate prediction and explanation.”92  In the 
majority of conflict studies, the site of knowledge production and study is, of course, “the field” 
where researchers define relatively arbitrary limits on what is studied in an attempt to replicate 
the control of the laboratory.   
In conflict studies, particularly the genocide studies subfield, the tendency to rely on 
modern analytical methods combined with a desire to produce the control of the laboratory leads 
to problematic explanations for the ontology of mass killing.  Human systems research requires 
fundamental assumptions that often go modern analytical ones.   Stanton’s framework is a good 
example.  His eight steps imply that the processes that lead to genocide display cause-and effect 
relationships and follow a stepwise pattern.  Classification leads to symbolization which leads to 
dehumanization and so on until the process matures into the extermination of a particular group.   
However, the consequences of the tendencies of those studying mass killing extend 
beyond simple explanations like Stanton’s.  Even the U.S. Agency for International 
Development’s (USAID) Conflict Assessment Framework, a relatively robust system, relies on 
“certain contextual factors [that] have been proven to increase the risk for conflict.”93  Risk 
factor lists are a common analytical tool used throughout the literature to identify when and how 
mass killing will occur.  They fall into the tradition of discrete categorization and, therefore, 
present three potential problems.   
First, lists give a name to processes, but often fail to explain why the social, economic, 
and political processes are happening.  For instance, exclusionary or antagonistic ideologies are 
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often cited as a factor that can lead to mass killing.  However, beyond identifying ideology as a 
problematic component of political and social leadership, it serving as a risk factor does little for 
analysis.  Second, risk factor lists sometimes attempt to reduce the complexity of human systems 
down to a discrete series of indicators of conflict.  There is a risk of missing factors that are less 
clear such as long-term processes operating beneath the surface.  An intersectional, context-
specific phenomena like mass killing likely cannot be explained by the current lists of risk 
factors; an episode in Sri Lanka will have vastly different causes than an episode in Guatemala.  
 Third, and perhaps most importantly, many of the risk factors on high-profile lists are 
not necessarily unique to mass killing.  For example, USAID’s list, produced in part by the 
Political Instability Task Force, consists of anocratic regimes, a recent history of conflict, “bad 
neighborhoods,” low levels of social development, state discrimination, and poverty.  While 
these conditionals undoubtedly make it more likely that killing will occur, they are not unique to 
the phenomena.  In other words, a lot of countries are led by autocratic regimes, have a history of 
conflict, exist in bad neighborhoods, have low social development, experience state 
discrimination, and have high levels of poverty, not all at the same time, and do not experience 
significant conflict.  Poverty is another particularly illustrative example of a popular, perhaps 
increasingly so,94 risk factor.  However, dozens of countries have poverty rates of over 30%,95 
yet killing happens in only a fraction of those places.  As a result, the logic goes that no one risk 
factor is causal, but when aggregated, the chance of conflict increases.   
Identifying risk factors for genocide is easier and arguably more accurate than the litany 
of conflict risk factor lists because of its uniqueness outlined in the official definition.  Unlike the 
more general “mass killing” category outlined above, the U.N. definition of genocide includes 	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the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part” clause96 which makes identifying genocide risk factors 
more feasible.  The U.N.’s genocide risk factors list includes “compulsory identification of 
members of a particular group” and “targeted elimination of community leaders”97 which, if 
present, provide a relatively clear indication that the “in part” clause is likely to apply, at least.  
However, two familiar problems persist - first, genocide risk factors sometimes give names to 
correlating processes, but often do not fully answer ontological questions and, second, they risk 
reducing the complexity of the processes.   
Section 2: Mapping an Alternative Through Complex Adaptive Systems   
 Complex adaptive systems (CAS) combined with institutional geographies of power 
could provide a plausible method of understanding the ontology of mass killing.  More broadly, 
CAS are a tool for social scientists to understand human systems, in this case mass killing 
systems.  The historical utility of CAS lies in natural systems prediction.98  The specifics of 
weather systems, hurricanes for example, are clearly difficult to predict, but they do follow a few 
general rules such as rotating counterclockwise in the northern hemisphere,99 forming an eye, 
and so on.  However, beyond these basic rules, hurricanes are unpredictable, hence the range of 
paths shown during news coverage.  As a result, the area of study of systems such as hurricanes 
was known as “chaos,” but is now a field of thinking called complexity science.100  It offers an 
alternative to some kinds of analytical thinking by acknowledging the limitations of the scientific 
method and the complexity of systems, particularly human systems.   
 Complexity science also offers key insights into how conflict, particularly mass killing, 	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comes to be.  It provides a unique lens through which to view conflict that overcomes typical 
pitfalls displayed in the literature.  In Stephen Gray and Josephine Roos’ conference paper about 
dynamical systems, a very similar concept to CAS, in a post-civil war South Sudan, they write 
“an advantage of this approach is that it ‘not only captures the multiple sources and complex 
temporal dynamics of such systems, but it can help identify central nodes and patterns that are 
unrecognisable by other means.’”101   
Alternatively, analyzing the entire mass killing phenomenon as a system that changes 
temporally is a supplement, at least, to individual risk factor understandings.  As a result, 
systems thinking promotes a holistic picture of mass killing that begins to see not only risk 
factors, but the relationship between those factors that provide space for killing to grow. As a 
matter of terminology, this paper will refer to dynamical systems and “ecology of violence”102 
simply as CAS.   
 Gray and Roos define CAS, in the context of conflict studies, as “a set of interconnected 
elements that influence one another over time to promote the emergence of a global state (such 
as war or peace), which in turn provides common meaning for the elements.”103  Similarly, Jones 
defines a system as “an assembly of elements hooked together to produce a whole in which the 
attributes of the elements contribute to a behavior of the whole.”104  These definitions begin to 
mark the differences between different types of systems and, therefore, what it means to be both 
complex and adaptive.  
 There are two important distinctions that make complex adaptive systems unique.  First, 
is determined versus adaptive.  Determined systems are those where inputs and outputs are 	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directly causal.  A car, for instance, is a determined system because when the driver turns the 
wheel, the tires move accordingly in a determined way.  Adaptive systems, however, are where 
elements of the system, often called agents, are connected to each other and follow a few basic 
rules.  The difference is that the system may not act in a predictable manner despite the agents 
acting relatively predictably.  According to Jones, “this is where the limitations of modern 
Western thinking hamper our imaginative capacity.”105  The potential disconnect between the 
actions of agents and the system-level outputs defies some aspects of modern analytical thinking.   
 The second important distinction is between complex and complicated systems.  
Complicated systems are those where agents and the connections between agents are equally 
important.106  Using the car analogy, all four tires, the gas pedal, and axle are equally necessary 
for acceleration as are their connections to each other.  The tires, gas pedal, and axle are also 
given no agency to function as they wish.  In complex systems, the connections between agents 
are more important than the agents themselves.  The agents have agency, but continue to follow 
simple system-wide rules.  These rules, however, do not entirely determine outcomes and in 
(CAS, “huge inputs may mean little or no output.”107  Unlike complicated determined systems, 
CAS can lead to outcomes that might not be evident if only the agents are analyzed.   
 The outcome of agents interacting as a whole within a system is called emergence, or 
emergent properties.  Midgley, as cited in Gallo, defines emergent properties as “one that results 
from the interaction of a system as a whole rather than from one or two of its parts in 
isolation.”108  Similarly, Hughes defines emergent behavior as “that [which] resides only in the 
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system as a whole and not in any of the constituent pieces.”109  More concretely this means that 
if actors in a conflict system - armed groups, politicians, peacekeepers, etc. - act in what seem 
like silos, their interactions are likely to produce a result different from simply the sum of those 
parts.   
 There are five other key concepts in complexity science that aid an understanding of the 
ontology of mass killing.  First, are system boundaries.  Just as researchers in “the field” have to 
make a decision about the physical extents of their studies, analysts using CAS have to define the 
boundaries of the system.  Obviously CAS do not exist in isolation and the size of a system could 
feasibly increase to a global scale, but for the purposes of conflict systems there have to be limits.  
Physical, temporal, symbolic, and ethical dimensions factor into how these lines are drawn.110  
Defining the system is important because it “shapes a conﬂict and has deep effects on how we 
tackle it.”111   
Second, are interconnected subsystems.  CAS do not exist as monolithic entities, but 
rather as aggregations of agents and agent-based subsystems.112  These subsystems might exist at 
different scales or geographical regions, but, crucially, the subsystems interact with each other 
similar to agents.  These subsystem relationships are also partially responsible for creating 
emergent behavior.   
Third, are causal loops.113  These lie at the heart of what makes CAS unique.  As outlined 
above, the relationships between agents are as important as the agents themselves meaning that 
the causal loops and feedback inherent in those relationships contribute to the behavior of the 
system.  One agent’s actions can cause other agents within its subsystem to react, setting off a 	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cycle of behavior that may affect the system at-large.   
Fourth, are delays.  According to Gallo, there are two types of delays - material and 
information.114  Material delays happen when physical objects travel throughout a system and, 
inherently, there is time between departure and arrival.  For example, the deployment of UN 
weapons inspectors from New York to Damascus.  Information delays happen when on-the-
ground data such as attitudes or conflict developments is transmitted to a news organization, 
politician, regional organization, etc.  These attitudes and decisions “take time to affect the state 
of a system”115 and therefore make predicting the system’s behavior more challenging.  Delays 
are one reason that temporal flexibility is important for CAS analysis.  If an agent changes at one 
part of the system, it takes time for the change to reach other parts of the system if it does at all.  
Moreover, a change might affect other parts of the system in disproportionate ways because of 
delays and the nonlinearity of CAS.116 
Fifth, is strength and strain.  Strength is what holds a system together and strain is what 
begins to tear or alter it.  It might be logical to think that conflict erupts when the strain of a 
system overwhelms its strength, but as Gall writes, “[strength and strain] in social systems, are so 
interwoven historically that it is very difﬁcult to separate them.”117  This means that the ties that 
bind communities like religion and politics can be the same ones that tear them apart.  The key is 
to find what transforms intra-institutional or intra-communal relationships from those of strength 
to those of strain.  Typically, as strain grows within a system it adapts or becomes more resilient 
in order to avoid a slide into a state of conflict.118   
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With these five principles in mind, the task of CAS becomes relatively clear.  Coleman et 
al. conceptualize the analyst’s purpose as “ specify[ing] the nature of [the] rules and the system-
level properties and behaviors that emerge from the repeated iteration of these rules.”119  In other 
words, finding the emergent properties of agents, relationships between agents, and the rules that 
govern them - dynamical minimalism120 - in order to understand the system’s dynamics121, 
potential outcomes, and predictability is the primary task for an observer of CAS.  In this way, 
analysts of conflict and mass killing can begin to understand ontological questions and prepare 
for practical, concrete prevention.   
 CAS can apply to mass killing in a variety of ways.  A conflict system can exist in 
multiple timescales - before the killing, during the killing, after the killing, or during all three. 
The goal of placing mass killing within the context of a CAS is to see how the killing could 
begin and, as a result, build resilience or strength in order to avoid an episode. 
 There are three primary guidelines for applying a conflict to CAS according to Coleman 
et al., who focus on so-called intractable conflicts.  First, an analyst must see the system.  This is 
an obvious yet important first step because it lays the groundwork for the rest of the analysis.  It 
also ensures, if done correctly, that the conflict is not over-simplified which is one of the primary 
reasons to use CAS.  To see a system is to “identify and work through key elements of the 
system...in a manner that is informed by the complexities of the situation.”122  Notably, this stage 
only identifies key elements and does not map them across a system yet.   
Gallo’s system boundaries principle factors heavily into how a conflict system is seen.  
For example, an analyst must choose whether the Darfur genocide CAS has limits in Sudan, East 	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Africa, Africa, and so on.  The broader the system, the more complex it is if all relationships are 
identified correctly.  Moreover, the system grows as the time period studied lengthens.  A pre- 
and post-conflict system can include actors such as educators, judges, and aid workers that might 
be excluded from systems specifically designed to help answer ontological questions.   
 Second, an analyst must “map the dynamic ecology of the conflict.”123  This process 
involves placing the actors in a logical place in the conflict system.  For example, grouping 
regional organizations and armed groups with similar ideologies, or countries that support a 
ruling regime.  One strategy for beginning to understand the relationship between agents, 
developed by Margorah Maruyama, sees complex systems as a series of loops and attempts to 
identify the nature of those loops.124  The essence of this method lies in discovering the way 
components are linked in mutually “causative loops.”  For each loop, or connection between two 
or more agents, the analyst can decide whether it is equilibrating (negative feedback), or 
escalating (positive feedback).  In a conflict system, this can be conceptualized as relationships 
that facilitate a balanced system called a “normal state” and relationships that facilitate an 
unbalanced system called an “at-risk” state.125 However, in a mass killing system “normal state” 
can mean maintaining conflict without mass killing.126  “At-risk” state means that mass killing is 
likely to happen, not just conflict in general.127 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Ibid., p. 10 
124 Hatt, Ken. "Considering Complexity: Toward A Strategy for Non-linear Analysis." Canadian Journal of 
Sociology/Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie. 34.2 (2009): 336-41.  
125 Gary and Roos, p. 10-1 
126 For more about conflict opportunities specifically related to resources see, Korf, Benedikt. "Resources, violence 
and the telluric geographies of small wars." Progress in Human Geography. 35.6 (2011): 733-56. 
127 The “normal” versus “at-risk” distinction is a blurred boundary.  The trajectory of the system is more important 
than classifying the system as one or the other. 
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Figure 1: A system can be visually represented using a chart showing the agents and 
relationships between them. 
 
Third, an analyst must apply “network analysis”128 to the map created during the second 
step.129  This involves assessing positive and negative relationships, which aids in understanding 
the components that help stabilize the system and those that destabilize the system.  Unlike a lot 
of complex systems, however, conflict and mass killing systems can have many components that 
simultaneously stabilize and destabilize or do either one at different times.  Crucially, this type of 
analysis can begin to “manage the anxiety associated with the overwhelming sense of complexity 
of the system.”130  Network analysis begins to answer inevitable utility questions that arise when 
using CAS.  In other words, the question becomes “what if we see conflicts and mass killing as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Coleman et al., p. 11 
129 For more about conflict space and network spaces see Flint, Colin, et al. "Conceptualizing ConﬂictSpace: Toward 
a Geography of Relational Power and Embeddedness in the Analysis of Interstate Conﬂict." Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers. 99.5 (2009): 827-35. 
130 Coleman et al., p. 11 
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complex adaptive system?”   
The identified loops and articulation of the relationship between agents and subsystems 
add applied value to CAS.  Ultimately, with time and trial and error, it may be possible to 
identify “leverage points”131 or places in the system that might have more explanatory power 
than others.  In Syria, for example, the relationship between the Assad regime and Israel 
potentially matters more, either in negative or positive ways, than the regime’s relationship with 
the United Kingdom.  However, the United Kingdom’s close relationship with the U.S. might 
form another leverage point.  According to Coleman et al., leverage grows over time and only 
then does it become apparent.   
 The nature of relationships can be thought of in four categories - primarily normal-state 
(PN), primarily at-risk (PA), simultaneous (S), and insignificant (I). 
 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 4 Agent 5 Agent 6 
Agent 1  X X X X X 
Agent 2   X X X X 
Agent 3    X X X 
Agent 4     X X 
Agent 5      X 
Agent 6        
 
Figure 2: An example diagram that identifies the nature of relationships between agents using 
PN, PA, S, and I distinctions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Ibid. 
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Figure 3: When the system map and network analysis are combined, it can be visually displayed 
using the PN, PA, S, and I distinctions 
 
The other three components, beyond system boundaries and loops, apply to conflict 
systems as well.  First, delays affect conflict systems in concrete ways when they are material-
based and in more abstract ways when they are information-based.  Material delays could consist 
of peacekeeper or inspector deployments, weapons trades, aid workers, ambassadors, and so on.  
This often manifests itself in the public perception of the U.N.  After the U.N. passes a resolution, 
sometimes there is an expectation that tangible results will immediately follow, but material 
delays cause lag.  This can have ripple effects throughout the system and cause delays in 
unexpected places.  Information delays can affect everything from battlefield commands to 
distant media coverage.  The results of this type of delay are often harder to predict.  Information 
on the ground must reach a messenger who then relays it to an agent in the system such as a 
media outlet or government which, when broadcasted, can have an affect on the ground, in other 
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words, creating a loop.  As information disseminates throughout the system, attitudes and 
behaviors might change relationships between agents and therefore changing the system at-large.   
Second, interconnected subsystems can apply to various components of systems at 
various levels.  Subsystems involve grouping can occur geographically, institutionally, 
functionally, etc.  These distinctions can also overlap.  For instance, the U.S. can act as a Global 
North agent, an international community agent, a humanitarian agent, and a military agent 
perhaps all at the same time.  Depending on the conflict, the analysis might benefit from having a 
military powers subsystem, but not a humanitarian aid subsystem.  Some reasonable ways to 
group actors are by geography, function, and type of institution - where the agent is, what they 
do, and the nature of their existence.   
Third, is strength and strain within conflict systems.  Conventionally these are understood 
as diametrically opposing forces - as strength grows, strain fades and vice versa.  This means that 
systems are either on a trajectory toward a conflict state, if strain is dominant, or a normal state, 
if strength is dominant.  However, Gall’s distinction - strength and strain are difficult to untangle 
in social systems - is crucial for analyzing mass killing.  Repeatedly, institutions have shown that 
they can either be sites of peacebuilding and togetherness or sites of conflict and division.  For 
instance, churches, mosques, and temples are frequently places where a diverse cross-section of a 
community gathers for worship.  As conflicts in Central African Republic,132 Nigeria,133 and 
Sudan,134 among others, show, places of worship can also serve as centers of conflict.  The 
massacre of hundreds of civilians at Nyarubuye church mere days after the start of the Rwandan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 "Interreligious violence poses long-term danger to Central African Republic, Ban warns." UN News Centre. 
United Nations. 
133 "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I): The Jos Crisis." International Crisis Group. 17 Dec 2012.  
134 "Sudan: Race and Religion in Civil War." Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs. Georgetown 
University, Aug 2013. 
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genocide135 famously showed how sites could be immediately transformed. 
Using Gall’s distinction, it is also reasonable to see certain sites as places of peace and 
conflict simultaneously.  Mosques in Cairo were used during the early 2010s as places of 
worship and organizing, but were also attacked by opposing political forces.  Sites of organizing 
can also promote strength and strain at the same time; actors can act as protectors of their group 
and perpetrators toward another group.  These sites can exist everywhere in mass killing systems 
- homes, community centers, sports fields, political party offices, and so on.  In other words, 
mass killing systems, inherently social systems, require seeing agents and sites as both potential 
places of strength and strain depending on the time and place in which they exist.  They may not 
be either promoting or restraining killing, but perhaps doing both.   
Section 3: Geographies of Power and GCAS136 
 Placing conflict within the context of CAS is not a novel idea.  This paper extends that 
analytical framework to mass killing as well.  In order to understand the critical ontological 
questions that lie at the heart of prevention work, however, another component is necessary.  
What transforms a normal state mass killing system into an at-risk state system?137  How does 
this transition happen?  Some analysts have proposed the idea of triggers - one cataclysmic event 
that immediately causes killing.  
 This paper posits an alternative argument - mass killing systems do not alternate between 
poles of normal state and conflict state, but rather represent long-term shifts in power that cause 
an escalation of violence.  The key to understanding these shifts is creating a geography of power 
within a CAS.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Keane, Fergal. "Massacre at Nyarubuye church." BBC News. 4 Apr 2004. 
136 The material cited from authors in this section is used for isolated purposes.  Many of the authors hold 
contrasting conceptions of geographies of power and geography more broadly.  
137 Again, this dichotomy is only meant to illustrate an aggregate picture of the system.  Functionally, the trajectory 
matters more than a clear distinction between normal state and at-risk state 
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 Geographies of power aid in understanding the contested “construction of places 
and spaces” and how “power relations [may] manifest in violence.”138  Darfur and Al Anbar, for 
instance, are not intrinsically conflict spaces, but are made so through attacks, occupation, and 
media narratives.  Bosco summarizes the meaning that geographies of power provide when he 
writes, “power is enmeshed in networks of relations and has different expressions” and “places 
should also be seen as solidifying intricate entanglements of power.”139  In other words, power 
resides in the relationships between agents, making the network analysis component of 
complexity studies particularly important to understanding how systems will behave. 
While GCAS do not use a geography of physical space, they do represent how power is 
distributed across landscapes.140  Power flows through systems just like other resources as it is 
“continually renegotiated in place-specific contexts.”141  Similarly, Allen popularized the notion 
that “power is enacted and resisted by an interaction between actors, an interaction that is 
mediated across and within spaces and places.”142  Rather than provide a static representation of 
power such as an index, geographies of power allow understandings to evolve temporally and 
spatially as circumstances change.  For instance, armed groups in DRC gained substantial power 
in the 1990s as the strength of the state declined because of a crumbling economy and aging 
dictator;143 power shifted from the capital in the west to border provinces in the eastern part of 
the country.  
         Geographies of power also take into account the concept of territoriality or “behaviour 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Kirsch, Scott, and Colin Flint. "Geographies of Reconstruction: Rethinking Post-War Spaces (forthcoming)." 4. 
139  Bosco, Fernando. Approaches to Human Geography. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2006. 142-3.  
140 See Figure 7 for a map of physical space that the geography of power accounts for. 
141 Kirsch and Flint, p. 6 
142 Lohman, Andrew, and Colin Flint. "The Geography of Insurgency." Geography Compass. 4.8 (2010): 1154. 
143 Matloff, Judith. "Bungle in the Jungle: How Zaire's Mobutu Failed." The Christian Science Monitor. 19 May 
1997.  
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that uses a bounded space, a territory, as the instrument for securing a particular outcome.”144  
Agents such as a U.N. peacekeeping mission or non-state armed group may aim to militarily 
control a certain province as a way of increasing their overall power.  Some territories such as a 
lucrative mining area or strategic transit route provide more power than other territories and 
agents might be likely to use violence to secure them.  For example, anti-Rwanda groups seized 
Goma, a key economic center in eastern DRC, during the Second Congo War because control of 
the city brings significant political power.  Capturing the territory later allowed the groups to 
attack Tutsis and Rwandan soldiers.145 
Agents may also enter into “security agreements” in order to gain territory and craft new 
sovereign spaces.  Radil and Flint contend that alliances between states and sub-state groups, 
such as armed groups, that attempted to “reterritorialize” parts of central Africa contributed to 
escalating conflict during the Congo wars.146  Geographies of power grapple with shifting 
territoriality by mapping how institutional control over spaces change. 
Geographies of power give GCAS utility that would not exist with CAS alone.  They 
provide insight into the location of a system's leverage points and sites of strength and strain.  
Tangibly, this means that locating power might mean locating where violence might begin.  
Lohman and Flint, in a study about insurgency, identify “situate[ing] power within nodes in a 
spatial network” as an emerging trend in the social sciences.147  GCAS continue this theme by 
exploring ontological questions about mass killing by identifying how power flows through 
systems and which power shifts could lead to extreme violence.    By locating centers of power, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Taylor , Peter. "The state as container: territoriality in the modern world-system." Progress in Human Geography. 
18.2 (1994): 151.  
145 Mgamba, Richard. "FDLR: From architects of genocide to Congo rebels." The Citizen. UNHCR, 13 Nov 2013.  
146 Radil, Steven, and Colin Flint. "Exiles and Arms: The Territorial Practices of State Making and War Diffusion in 
Post–Cold War Africa." Territory, Politics, Governance. 1.2 (2013): 185. 
147 Lohman and Flint, p. 1162 
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it might be possible to locate potential spaces of killing and peace.  In a mass killing context this 
could mean identifying institutions or individuals that influence whether a country or region 
militarizes and slides into violence.  In DRC, the U.S., Yoweri Museveni, and Jean-Pierre Bemba 
are examples of agents who affected the outcome of the war and onset of mass killing.   
Geographies of power are often used in economic geography,148 especially of the critical 
sort,149 to investigate how global economic policy is made.  They are also used for more 
conventional geopolitical analyses to answer questions about zones of policy influence.150  
Economists map how institutions shape income disparities, financial markets, and global wealth 
distribution.151  Conflict analysts could do the same with institutions that affect the likelihood of 
mass killing.  They could be as large as the U.N. or as small as a local pastor.  In Peet’s 
Geography of Power: The Making of Global Economic Policy he writes that “‘a new kind of 
economic power system has arrived on the world scene’ in which a few spaces control others at 
the global scale.”152   
Similarly, mass killing systems have spaces, agents, and relationships that matter more 
than others and shape the trajectory of the system.  The key is mapping how much power each 
institution or agent has and how much their relationships affect their respective subsystem or 
system at-large.  This can be represented using a table with a specific type of power (political, 
social, economic, etc.) on one axis and an agent on the other.  Each agent can be ranked, from 0-
2 as an example, for each type of power and then totaled to get an idea about how powerful they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Renda, Andrea. "Globalization, the New Geography of Power, and EU Policy Response." The Transatlantic 
Relationship and the Future of Global Governance. Transworld, March 2013. 
149 Peet, Richard. "Geography of power: the making of global economic policy." Journal of Economic Geography. 
8.6 (2008): 830-2.  
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  46 
are in the system at-large.  The totals can then be applied to the mapped system. 
 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 4 Agent 5 Agent 6 
Power 
Type 1 X X X X X X 
Power 
Type 2 X X X X X X 
Power 
Type 3 X X X X X X 
Power 
Type 4 X X X X X X 
Total Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Figure 4: Estimates of power can be shown by ranking each agent based on specific types of 
power 
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Figure 5: The total power calculated for each agent in Figure 4 can be applied to the system map 
 
 
CAS, in isolation, are effective in explaining how a variety of systems operate.  
Geographies of power explain which institutions affect outcomes the most.  This paper posits 
that combining CAS and geographies of power could offer a new method for answering 
ontological questions about mass killing that addresses some of the shortcomings and limitations 
addressed in the literature review and first section of the second chapter.  It accounts for 
complexity that other methods sometimes undervalue; it expands analyses beyond episodes of 
genocide; it applies to a wide range of cases; it relies on more than risk factors and triggers; and, 
perhaps most importantly, it begins to answer questions that can lead to tangible prevention 
policy. The analytical process involves seeing the system, mapping the system, identifying 
relationships, creating a geography of power, and overlaying the two components. 
Overlaying the two components - CAS and geography of power to create what this paper 
will call a geographic complex adaptive system (GCAS) - is the final, arguably most important, 
and difficult stage of the proposed theory.  Visually, it may be thought of as follows.  First, the 
CAS consisting of agents, relationships, and integrated subsystems is laid as an initial plane, 
oriented horizontally.  Then, the geography of power is laid atop the CAS as the second plane, 
oriented vertically.  Together, the two planes form a three-dimensional schematic with the CAS 
acting as the x and y-axes and the geography of power acting as the z-axis.  It can be visually 
imagined as a model of an urban landscape - the plots of land being agents, roads being 
relationships, boroughs being subsystems; and buildings being the power that agents and 
institutions have.  The taller the building is, the greater the power.  This can be represented two-
dimensionally using shading to represent power. 
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Figure 6: The complete GCAS will represent agents, relationships, and levels of power 
After the schematic is created, the analysis turns to the temporal components.  Mass 
killing systems can transform rapidly including who the agents are and how much power they 
have; subsystems, systems, and their emergent behaviors change as well.  A system may be 
called a mass killing system, but may not produce mass killing; in CAS terms, it remains in a 
normal state.  There will be cases that do evolve into mass killing.  This paper, in its quest for 
ontological answers, only considers systems in transition from a normal state to a conflict state.  
However, the transition is not sudden or discrete.  As mentioned earlier, the proposed schematic 
conceptualizes a transition to mass killing as slow changes in institutional power.   
Moreover, some systems are more clearly in a conflict state that produces mass killing 
than others.  For instance, Syria during 2012 experienced mass killing system by many 
definitions, including this papers’.  Burma, however, is an example of a system that often 
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fluctuates between latent violence and manifest violence.153  As a result, analysts can focus on 
conflict systems and the respective geography of power, but be prepared to transform the 
analysis if mass killing occurs.  Selecting the conflicts suitable for analysis can be done using the 
plethora of watchlists generated by NGOs such as Jewish World Watch154.  Simply because these 
countries are on a watchlist, however, does not mean they should automatically be considered 
within a mass killing system.  A watchlist placement almost certainly means the country should 
be in a conflict system, but is not necessarily a mass killing system.  For prevention purposes, 
analysts could use the watchlists to monitor key power shifts. 
This paper asserts that mass killing occurs when power shifts within a GCAS in a way 
that promotes inequity.  Shifts could be a change in a peacekeeping mandate, an eroding of the 
state monopoly over force, defections, legislative changes, arms shipments, international 
interventions, and so on.  When these shifts occur, it opens space for mass killing to develop, 
called mass killing opportunities.  Crucially, shifts in power do not always result in mass killing; 
hence it is an opportunity, not a commitment.  For example, the 2012 elections in Kenya were an 
opportunity for mass killing to occur.  Post-election violence in 2007 that killed approximately 
1,500155 people and “difficulties...symptomatic of larger political and institutional questions 
related to democratic change”156 could have spelled disaster, but little violence resulted.  In other 
words, the shift in institutional power that occurred as a result of the election presented an 
opportunity for mass killing, but it failed to actualize.  This example shows that it can take 
several shifts in power at similar times to allow for mass killing.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Clapp, Priscilla. "Communal Violence in Burma." United States Institute of Peace.  27 Jun 2012. 
154 "High Risk Country Watch List." Jewish World Watch. <http://www.jewishworldwatch.org/conflictareas/world-
crises/high-risk-country-watch-list>. 
155 "Deal to end Kenyan crisis agreed." BBC News. 12 Apr 2008. 
156 Mueller, Susanne. "Dying to win: Elections, political violence, and institutional decay in Kenya." Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies. 29.1 (2011): 99. 
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Visually, it may be conceptualized as a stack of Swiss cheese, with each slice 
representing agents, rotating in different directions at different rates.  As the slices rotate, power 
shits and agents adapt.  However, in the few circumstances when holes in the cheese align top to 
bottom, a mass killing opportunity arises; space is made available to agents looking to gain 
power.  If an agent or institution capitalizes on this opportunity, mass killing occurs.  
There are several important theoretical outcomes of using GCAS.  First, it clearly 
separates mass killing from all other kinds of conflict using a clear definition of the phenomenon 
- widespread, intentional killing of noncombatants by state or non-state actors.  Quantitatively, 
the scale of death must be 1,000 noncombatants in a twelve-month span.  Second, GCAS present 
a non-teleological conception of mass killing.  Unlike some models, often focusing on genocide, 
outlined in the first chapter, GCAS do not represent mass killing as the final stage in a linear 
sequence.   
The medium- and long-term power shifts in CGAS occur relatively gradually and are 
intertwined with history, politics, and social relations as shown by the complexity.  Mass killing 
can wax and wane over time, gradually becoming more or less intense.  In other words, the 
trajectory of a GCAS - whether it is moving toward mass killing or away from it - matters more 
than a defined teleology.  Similar to Whitehead’s theory of democratization that asserts a regime 
should strive toward “a stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and equality of 
citizens,”157 atrocity prevention practitioners could attempt to drive systems away from mass 
killing toward positive peace.   
Conclusion 
This chapter identified risk factor lists as one of the most popular ways to assess the onset 
of mass killing and also critique their utility given the complexity of conflict systems.  It 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Whitehead, Laurence. Democratization: Theory and Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 27.  
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proposed a schematic that combines complex adaptive systems, a tool used in many disciplines, 
and geographies of power.  The complex adaptive systems allow analysts to identify which 
people, groups, and institutions are involved in mass killing systems.  They also clarify how 
those agents interact and whether those relationships promote a trajectory that tends toward mass 
killing.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of geographies of power which are essential to 
understanding when opportunities for mass killing present themselves.  The next chapter applies 
the geographic complex adaptive system schematic to the Second Congo War. 
Chapter 3: Geographic Complex Adaptive Systems in the Second Congo War 
Introduction 
This chapter begins with background information about conflict in Democratic Republic 
of the Congo beginning with Belgian king Leopold II and continuing through the Second Congo 
War.  The war is unique because of its historic death toll and tremendous complexity.  The 
second section begins to situate the war within an abbreviated geographic complex adaptive 
system using tools such as a relationship typology and power ranking.  The geography of power 
is particularly useful in determining how long-term changes affect the ontology of mass killing.  
Section 1: Beginnings of the “Great War in Africa”158 
The Second Congo War, also called the Great War in Africa, was one of the deadliest 
conflicts in history.  Some estimates say that 5.4 million159 people have been killed since 1996 
while others place the death toll at 3.9 million160 from 1998-2004.  It is notoriously known as one 
of the world’s most complex conflicts, but as noted Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
expert Jason Stearns wrote, “[The] dismal picture is misleading.  Congo’s problems are complex, 	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but certainly not beyond repair.”161  It is not uncommon to read reports from high-level 
organizations that begin with a simple assertion - “DRC is a very complicated place” under the 
subheading “the paralysis of complexity.”162 
GCAS could be a way to begin to tackle the unique challenges posed by DRC’s “alphabet 
soup of acronyms”163 representing armed groups, U.N. agencies, and government policies.  
Coleman et al.’s reasoning for using CAS - “manag[ing] the anxiety associated with the 
overwhelming sense of complexity of the system”164 - applies near perfectly.  GCAS can break 
down the complexity, place agents in an orderly way, illuminate networks, demonstrate power 
differentials, and, ultimately, explain how and why mass killing occurred during the Second 
Congo War.   
The background to the war could feasibly date to when King Leopold II of Belgium 
colonized the territory for personal gain in the 1880s.  Leopold enslaved the native population 
and created a harsh forced labor system to collect sap to create lucrative rubber reserves.  The 
state of Belgium took over the territory in 1908, but many of the exploitative practices continued.  
After Belgium granted independence in 1960, the U.S., United Kingdom, and Belgium 
assassinated the first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, fearing that he was sympathetic to the 
Soviet Union.  After five years of political turmoil, Mobutu Sésé Seko came to power with the 
support of the U.S. and Belgium.165    
The havoc wreaked by Leopold during the late 19th century, Belgium during the early 
20th century, the U.S. the Cold War, and others during the 20th century is widely considered to 	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be a contributing factor to not only the conflict in DRC, but also the genocide in Rwanda.166167  
Each of them used Congo either as a source of riches or as a geopolitical proxy and none of them 
cared about the wellbeing of the people living there.  The war was preceded by the First Congo 
War, beginning in 1996, that replaced Mobutu Sésé Seko, in power since 1965, with armed 
group leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the current president’s father.  The main causes of the war 
were Mobutu’s weakening cult of personality,168 a crumbling economy in Zaire,169 and, perhaps 
most importantly, instability in the eastern part of the country partially caused by spillover from 
the Rwandan genocide two years prior170. 
The Second Congo War began in began in August 1998 when a group of Banyamulenge, 
or ethnic Tutsis living in eastern DRC, erupted into mutiny in Goma,171 a major mining city and 
the center of conflict in North Kivu province.  Rwandan and Uganda forces quickly seized North 
Kivu and South Kivu172.173  Soon, non-governmental soldiers affiliated with Uganda (Movement 
for the Liberation of Congo, MLC) and Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de 
Angola) as well governmental soldiers from Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Libya, Chad, Sudan, 
and Central African Republic were fighting and killing.  Additionally, Zambia, Tanzania, and 
South Africa were providing some type of support for Kabila’s efforts to save his 
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administration.174  The motivations for getting involved in the war were diverse, ranging from 
protecting family mining interests the case of Namibia to eliminating long-standing rebel groups 
in the case of Angola.  
 
Figure 7: Map of DRC and surrounding region 
Ugandan and Rwandan collaboration began to fracture as missions clashed and interests 
diverged.  In August 1999, groups backed by both countries fought in Kisangani,175 the third 
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largest city in the country.  In February 2000, the U.N. authorized a peacekeeping mission, 
MONUC, now called MONUSCO, to address the violence.176  Laurent-Désiré Kabila was killed 
in January 2001177 and his son, Joseph, replaced him as leader of a weak state with foreign forces 
at every corner.  In 2002, Rwanda’s role in the killing decreased as their proxy forces grew 
resistant to unending violence and control from Kigali.  Simultaneously, Kabila’s fresh 
leadership, despite his youth and inexperience, proved to be successful in securing parts of 
western DRC.  He proved to have sharp diplomacy skills and control over his military leaders 
that was unseen under his father.  
 Kabila signed a series of piecemeal peace agreements throughout 2002 as Rwanda’s 
military presence crumbled and Uganda felt the need to remove its troops.  The Sun City 
Agreement, Pretoria Accord, and the Global All-Inclusive Agreement established a fragile peace 
between Kabila, Rwanda, Uganda, MLC, RCD, and others.  A transitional government led by 
Kabila and consisting of a mosaic of interests carried over from the war assumed power in July 
2003 and Kabila was officially elected in 2006 and remains in power today.178  There was 
significant violence even after the peace agreements were signed as groups struggled to give up 
ideologies and logics of violence.  Foreign involvement in the violence decreased, but Rwandan 
proxies remained a persistent problem for Kinshasa.  Conflict in North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, 
and Katanga179 continued to kill thousands of civilians.   
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 During the height of the war from 1998-2001, approximately 350,000180 people were 
killed directly by violence181 with many more being killed after the 2002 peace treaties.  In total, 
over 3 million people were killed because of the direct and indirect causes of the war.  This paper 
is only concerned with the war’s mass killing episodes,182 which were quite frequent.  The 
episodes that killed the most civilians consisted of raids on villages, battles in residential areas, 
and disorganized violence between untrained soldiers.  For example, as Rwandan and Ugandan 
soldiers approached Kinshasa in August 1998, Laurent-Désiré Kabila called for normal citizens 
to arm themselves.  This resulted in mob-like groups roaming the city killing people who they 
suspected of being sympathetic to outside forces.183 
As outlined above, DRC exists in a conflict system.  Peace treaties did not end the 
violence and even during times of relative peace such as 2010, there is a reasonable threat of 
violence, the rise of the M23 in 2011 for instance.  At times, such as during the height of the war, 
DRC existed in a mass killing system.  The definition of mass killing outlined above applied for 
a significant period of time.  GCAS can begin to explore how a war became a context for mass 
killing.   
Section 2: The Second Congo War as a Geographic Complex Adaptive System184 
The process of analyzing the ontology of mass killing in DRC during the Second Congo 
War is similar to analyzing other conflicts using a GCAS: see the system, map the dynamics of 	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the conflict, apply network analysis, and overlay a geography of power.  Additionally, the 
analysis must define the system’s boundaries and identify potential delays, subsystems, and 
places of strength and strain.  This process and conceptualization has the potential to lend insight 
into how the Second Congo War’s mass killing began by identifying the rules governing 
behavior, emergent properties, and transformative power shifts.   
 The Second Congo War is an unusually large system even by conservative conceptions of 
the conflict.  The system, as this paper sees it, largely exists within Africa, from Tripoli to 
Pretoria, but it also includes critical agents outside of the continent such as the U.N.  The system 
boundaries at-large extend to an international level, but simultaneously exist at local and regional 
levels as well185 depending on the agent in each subsystem.  There are six groups of key 
agents.186  First, the countries involved on the side of Kabila.  Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe 
provided a significant amount of military support for Kabila’s forces as they battled a variety of 
opponents, primarily in the eastern part of the country.  Libya, Chad, Sudan, Central African 
Republic, Tanzania, Zambia, and South Africa provided Kabila with either logical, minor 
military, or political support. 187188 
 Second, are armed groups that explicitly opposed the Kabila regime or fought against 
Kabila-aligned forces for other political reasons.  While there were “at least 20 different armed 
groups”189 operating at various times, this paper will focus on the RCD, Banyamulenge, MLC, 
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Mai Mai groups, and their individual leaders such as Jean-Pierre Bemba.190  Third, and related, is 
Rwanda and Uganda.  They necessitate a separate category because of their integral role in the 
invasion and perpetration of mass killing throughout the war.  This will also include the effects 
of the Rwandan genocide in eastern DRC. 
 Fourth, is the Kabila regime, including his familial successor, and the Forces Armées de 
la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), DRC’s official fighting force.  This will be an 
especially important agent given the political power that Kabila wielded as well as the FARDC’s 
chronic inability to combat outside forces on its own.  Fifth, is the international system including 
the U.N., MONUC, the U.S., France and so on.  Sixth, are civilians in multiple capacities - 
purveyors of divisions, promoters of reconciliation, civil society leaders, and so on.  In a conflict 
or mass killing system, the non-combatants can be overlooked as agents, but they are the targets 
of the violence, and sometimes the perpetrators.  
Using these key agents, the dynamic ecology of the mass killing system may be mapped 
by placing the agents in a logical space within the system and identifying the relationships 
between them, not necessarily the nature of those relationships.  For the Second Congo War, the 
interconnected subsystems are largely based on the groupings listed above - pro-Kabila regimes, 
Rwanda and Uganda, various armed groups, the Kabila regime, the international system, and 
civilians - in various capacities.  The connections between these subsystems are relatively clear, 
despite the complexity of the system at-large.  The pro-Kabila regimes and the Kabila regime 
itself collaborated in the fight against Rwanda, Uganda, and various armed groups but, the bulk 
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of the combat rested with the FARDC.  Zimbabwe provided modern air support,191 Angola 
focused on southern DRC where there were UNITA mining operations, and Namibia provided 
more general support to protect family interests in the mining sector.192  
 The international system, most notably the U.N., had significant relationships with the 
Kabila regime, anti-Kabila armed groups, and Rwanda and Uganda.  Following the Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement in 1999, the first of many such agreements during the war, the U.N. 
deployed 90 liaison personnel to support the agreement.193  In 2000, one of the most important 
shifts in the war happened with the deployment of MONUC, a peacekeeping force tasked with 
maintaining some type of order.  The U.N.’s relationship with Rwanda and Uganda was more 
complicated as it attempted to maintain a sense of neutrality while also fighting armed groups 
supported by those regimes.   
The U.N. and MONUC, however, cannot be viewed as a monolith for they are nothing 
without contributions and leadership from member states.  For instance, the first commander of 
MONUC was Senegalese Major General Mountago Diallo194 and some of the biggest troop 
contributions came from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan195.  In other words, in addition to being 
a global force, the U.N. can be conceptualized as a package of other countries with varying 
interests.  The U.S., as an example, contributed 25% to the U.N. budget in 2000 and chaired the 
Security Council,196 but had limited participation in MONUC, likely because the Clinton 
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administration did not see DRC as a security or moral priority197.  Alternatively, France, a 
permanent member of the Security Council, encouraged Chad to send troops to support Kabila as 
a way to regain some influence in a region that France withdrew from after the genocide in 
Rwanda.198   
The armed groups opposing Kabila’s forces and MONUC have a relatively clear 
connection with Rwanda and Uganda.  As mentioned above, the RCD and Banyamulenge were 
aligned with and directly supported by the Rwandan government.  Meanwhile, the Ugandan 
government directly supported the MLC.  As a result, there was a tense relationship between the 
Kabila regime, President Kagame of Rwanda, and President Museveni of Uganda.  These armed 
groups also have clear relationships with the Kabila regime and international system because of 
the direct combat between them.199   
Assessing the relationships between civilians in the system is far less clear because the 
line between noncombatant and combatant can be blurry; nobody is born a combatant, which 
means there is a transition into and out of violence.  For example, Mai Mai, or community-based 
armed groups in eastern DRC, quickly mobilize and demobilize as threats evolve.200  Civilians 
can not only evolve into perpetrators of violence, but also are the targets of violence.  This means 
that similar to the U.N., civilians cannot be seen as a monolith.  Some of their relationships 
might promote a normal state while others might promote an at-risk state.   
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Figure 8: The war’s six key agents and the relationships between them 
With the system mapped, it is possible to apply network analysis that assigns normative 
identities to the relationships between agents, identifies leverage points, points of strength and 
strain, and possible delays.201  As noted earlier, these relationships can simultaneously promote a 
normal state and at-risk state meaning that no relationship is purely one or this other. As a result, 
this paper will use four categories to evaluate relationships as a way to grapple with the 
complexity: primarily at-risk (PA), primarily normal (PN), simultaneous (S), and insubstantial (I), 
for the relationships that likely do not affect emergent behavior.202   
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 Kabila Regime 
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Armed Groups    PA PA S 
Pro-Kabila 
Regimes     PA S 
Rwanda, 
Uganda, Others      S 
Civilians       
 
Figure 9: The nature of the relationships between the key agents using PN, PA, S, and I 
distinctions  
 
While the “primarily at-risk” relationships might seem most relevant for analyzing the 
ontology of mass killing, all of them affect the system in different and important ways.   
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Figure 10: Depiction of the system using PN, PA, S, and I distinctions 
 
Delays exist throughout the system, but the delays inherent in three of the relationships 
are particularly important.  First, between the international system and anti-Kabila armed groups.  
At the most basic level, the operationalization of MONUC took time.  The resolution authorizing 
the force was passed in February 2000 and it took until July 2001 for the force to surpass 2,300 
personnel.203   More importantly, it takes time for the effects of the force to be felt by the anti-
Kabila armed groups, especially because of the defensive nature of its mandate.  Second, 
between Rwanda, Uganda and anti-Kabila armed groups.  Information takes time to go from 
Kampala or Kigali to the MLC or RCD.204  This affects how quickly battleground realities 
change which can affect the broader system.  Third, is between civilians and Rwanda and 
Uganda.  Much of the violence at the beginning of the war, and arguably throughout it, was 	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driven by genocide spillover as well as ethnic politics and competing nationalisms.  The 
information that informs the ideologies driving local hatred and violence takes time to evolve 
and disseminate via politicians, media networks, and informal social networks and it takes even 
longer for those changes to affect behavior.   
There are several sites of strength and strain in this system that can affect the transition to 
mass killing.  Most obvious are sites of direct violence, primarily in North Kivu and South Kivu.  
These are places of great strain that result in deaths and displacements of combatants and 
noncombatants.  Less obvious places of strain are those such as village political centers led by 
elders or local politicians.  Some of these places produced Mai Mai groups to defend the territory 
under their control.  There are few clear sites of strength, but the clearest example might be 
health clinics, hospitals, and other places devoted to rebuilding and reconciliation even as the 
conflict is happening.  MONUC bases might seem like places of strength, but they can attract 
attacks such as the one in Kirumba that killed three peacekeepers205.  Clearly, most places are 
simultaneously sites of strength and strain.  From individual houses to the Congolese parliament, 
the role of places shifted throughout the conflict as armed groups came and went and peace 
treaties faltered.   
Identifying leverage points within the system is challenging because one agent alone has 
little explanatory potential.  However, it can be seen in relativity - which agents might provide 
more insight into the ontology of mass killing than others.  Rwanda, Uganda, and the anti-Kabila 
armed groups have clear importance because they were the ones supporting and perpetrating 
most of the mass killing.  Also, the spillover from the Rwandan genocide holds explanatory 
potential.  However, the Kabila regime and international system should also be included.  	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Kabila’s polarizing, violent rise to power during the First Congo War set the stage for future 
violence and his leadership during the Second Congo War based heavily on geopolitical strategy 
promoted, perhaps out of necessity, a divided region.  The international system also affected 
mass killing.  While engagement, particularly from the Northwest, with the war was relatively 
low given the death toll, the international system’s actions remained important.  MONUC is an 
obvious example, but the sheer scale and legitimacy of the U.N. and U.S. are significant.  $15 
million in U.S. arms sales to DRC, for instance, during the decade prior to the war and the U.S.’ 
militarization of Africa more broadly after the conclusion of the Cold War206 could feasibly be 
considered factors that contributed to the killing.   
With all of the CAS components in place, the geography of power may be mapped and 
applied.  In this abbreviated model, the geography of power will be similar to the leverage points 
outlined above.  However, it will also aim to identify shifts in power that led to the mass killing 
during the war.  The six key agents - Kabila regime, international system, anti-Kabila armed 
groups, civilians, pro-Kabila regimes, and Rwanda and Uganda - represent different sorts of 
power during the war that each carried different weight.  The Kabila regime held obvious 
political power as the leader of the country, but it also possessed the power to coordinate; it was 
able to coordinate, albeit with mixed results, FARDC, the international system, and pro-Kabila 
regimes to work on its behalf.   
The international system held power, as mentioned above, because of its scale and degree 
of legitimacy.  MONUC was a persistent force on the ground while numerous aid agencies tried 
to address the humanitarian crisis.  They also held power remotely as the U.N. passed resolutions 
condemning the violence, the U.S. supplied weapons and condemning rhetoric, and France 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Hartung and Moix, 2000 
	  66 
encouraged Chad to join the fight, as examples.  In other words, similar to the Kabila regime, 
they were powerful in political and military ways.  Rwanda, Uganda, and the anti-Kabila armed 
groups, as well as some of their leaders, held a tremendous amount of power in the system.  
Museveni and Kagame effectively organized proxy forces as well as directly supplied troops to 
fight Kabila and establish their control in eastern and central provinces.  John Pierre-Bemba, the 
leader of MLC, and Ernest Wamba dia Wamba and Emile Ilunga, leaders of RCD and RCD-
Goma, had loyal followings of soldiers207 mobilized by divisive politics, charisma, and a low-
standard of living.  These two groups - Rwanda and Uganda and the anti-Kabila armed groups - 
were tightly interwoven during the war and jointly participated in the mass killing.  Their power 
to organize, ethnicize, and kill cannot be understated.   
 The pro-Kabila regimes that provided support via their militaries held more power than 
those that provided primarily political support.  The FARDC is notoriously unfit to defend 
DRC’s territory because of loose troop integration policies and poor training meaning without 
foreign support, the result of the war might have been different.  As mentioned earlier, MONUC 
largely provided reactive, defensive support, but troops from Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe 
did not have a U.N. mandate providing rules of engagement208.  As a result, the geography of 
power within this group of agents is split between those that provided military support and those 
that did not. 
The power of civilians in any mass killing system is a complicated question as illustrated 
by Figure 8.  More specific agents within the civilian category such as civil society organizations, 
religious leaders, and elders obviously have varying degrees of power.  However, for the 
purposes of this abbreviated case study, civilians will be viewed as an aggregate, accounting for 	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their various roles and capacities.  Due to a lack of localized early warning systems and other 
community empowerment tools during the war, normal civilians held little power and had few 
ways to resist the killing other than organizing Mai Mai groups.  Civil society groups, even after 
the formal conclusion of the war created “counter-discourses”209 and helped to control and 
produce a social fabric that combated environments of violence.  Alternatively, as outlined above, 
elders, expecting little help from FARDC, organized community militias to defend themselves, 
but ended up creating forces that killed many civilians.   
These different forms of power were expressed differently throughout the war, sometimes 
with guns and other times with radios.  However, as outlined above there were four primary 
kinds of power: political, military, social, and coordinating; the last type being the ability to 
coordinate other agents.  The level of each agent’s power can be represented as a level 0, 1, or 2 
for the sake of this abbreviated model.210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Iñiguez de Heredia, Marta. "Escaping Statebuilding: Resistance and Civil Society in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding. 6.1 (2012): 75.  
210 The 0, 1, 2 rankings are based on aggregations of power rather than individual circumstances.  For instance, the 
social power of the Kabila regime is the degree to which they can socially influence people throughout the country. 
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 Kabila Regime 
International 
System 
Anti-Kabila 
Armed 
Groups 
Pro-Kabila 
Regimes 
Rwanda, 
Uganda, 
Others 
Civilians 
Political 
Power 2 2 1 1 2 1 
Military 
Power 2 1 2 1 1 1 
Social 
Power 1 0 2 0 2 2 
Coordinating 
Power 2 1 0 0 1 0 
Total 7 4 5 2 6 4 
 
Figure 11: Table matching agents with types of power in order to determine their total power in 
the system.   
 
When this power analysis is applied to the system, the nodes of control and their 
relationships begin to become apparent. 
	  69 
 
 
Figure 12: The full GCAS schematic with agents, relationships, and power levels 
 
The last analytical task is to identify the shifts in power across the GCAS that might have 
contributed to the war’s mass killing.  There are five primary power shifts, using the agents 
identified above, that contributed to the mass killing during the war.  First, is a shift that occurred 
during the First Congo War - the downfall of Mobutu and installation of Kabila.  Mobutu 
dominated the territory then called Zaire for nearly 32 years as the Northwest ignored his 
kleptocracy and human rights abuses as it battled for control of the region during the Cold 
War.211  Mobutu created a strong cult of personality that enabled him to maintain control of DRC 
and largely remain inward looking when it came to regional politics.  However, after the Soviet 
Union fell in 1990 and Northwestern support declined, he ended the ban on multi-party 	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politics212 which paved the way to his overthrow in 1997 by Kabila.  This change from Mobutu 
to Kabila was a seismic geopolitical shift that broke Mobutu’s grip on DRC domestic power and, 
to a limited extent, regional power.  It did not create a power vacuum necessarily, but rather 
signaled that DRC was open to exploitation and, ultimately, invasion. 
Second, is the power shift in the eastern part of the country caused by insufficient 
military leadership under Kabila, spillover from the Rwandan genocide, a proliferation of armed 
groups and aggressive Rwandan and Ugandan policies.  This is arguably the most important shift 
in the geography of power that caused mass killing.  While the DRC military, called Forces 
Armées Zaïroises under Mobutu, were stronger prior to Kabila’s takeover, it remained relatively 
weak.  There were only 25,000 ground forces in 1993.213  Mobutu’s command over what strength 
he had, however, was effective in handling the numerous armed challenges that he faced.  During 
the early days after Kabila became head of the military, it was fragmented, leaderless, and could 
not handle practical challenges such as translation.214  Additionally, Rwanda and Uganda saw a 
moment of opportunity with a weak Congolese executive and fighting force.  For economic, 
political, and social reasons including historical distrust and ethnic incitement, both countries 
sponsored large armed groups to fight on their behalf.215  These armed groups - RCD, MLC, 
Banyamulenge groups, etc. - were the primary perpetrators of mass killing during the war.216  
Kabila’s weak territorial and military control combined with increasing power to DRC’s east and 
genocide spillover played major roles in the ontology of mass killing.   
Third, is the international system’s disengagement with DRC after the fall of the Soviet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Noble, Kenneth. "Mobutu Ends Zaire's One-Party System." The New York Times. 25 Apr 1990.  
213 "Zaire: National Security." Factba.se. CantyMedia. Dec. 1993. 
214 Prunier, Gerard. Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental 
Catastrophe. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 150. 
215 Clark, John. The African Stakes of the Congo War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 156. 
216 Gettleman, Jeffrey. "The Horror, The Horror (Review of Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the 
Congo and the Great War of Africa)." New Republic. 19 May 2011.  
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Union in 1990.  The U.S. in particular had a vested interest in supporting Mobutu after the CIA, 
working with others, installed him in the 1960s as they attempted to ward off Soviet influence in 
the region.217  However, during the years prior to 1997, the Clinton administration allowed a 
river of guns and military training to flow into region via direct delivery of weapons and 
commercial sales.218  Beyond rhetorical condemnation, humanitarian relief efforts, and a 
defensive peacekeeping force, there was little significant engagement.  This allowed Rwanda, 
Uganda, armed groups, pro-Kabila regimes and the Kabila regime itself to kill with little 
oversight or accountability.   
Fourth, is the decreased agency and power of civilians throughout the war.  Although 
there were cases where civilians organized militias and willingly joined armed groups, the 
majority of people were caught in a place with little agency or power.  The geopolitics of the war 
were occurring at a level beyond the reach of most ordinary Congolese and ethnicization was 
being driven by a deluge of refugees and participants in the genocide spilling over from Rwanda 
as well as directly from the regimes to the east.  Moreover, as mentioned earlier, civilians had 
almost no way to systematically protect themselves using an early warning system.  This is not to 
say that civilians did not have any agency or power, but it likely decreased as violence 
intensified and body counts rose.   
Fifth, is the transition from Laurent-Désiré Kabila to his son, Joseph Kabila.  Joseph 
assumed the presidency after his father was assassinated in January 2001.  Despite his lack of 
experience, the younger Kabila seemed to be more willing to engage in negotiations while 
simultaneously managing FARDC.219  A significant amount of killing occurred from when he 	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took office until the Global All-Inclusive Agreement was signed in December 2002.220  The 
relationship between Joseph and the formal conclusion of the war might only be a correlation.  
While both Kabilas came to power in the context of war, Joseph was chief of staff of DRC’s 
official land forces while his father was accustomed to unofficial guerilla warfare.  Moreover, the 
older Kabila had a more complex relationship with Rwanda and Uganda because of their support 
of his army in his fight against Mobutu.221  Joseph did not have that connection which could have 
contributed to his tendency toward conciliation in 2002.   
 These five shifts of power, from one agent or subsystem to another, during the Second 
Congo War begin to answer ontological questions about why and how the killing came to be.  
Power shifts away from agents and relationships that promoted a normal state toward those that 
promoted an at-risk state opened opportunities for mass killing within the context of a regional 
war.  A litany of agents seized those opportunities with the deadliest of consequences.  
Obviously these only begin to understand the war’s mass killing, but GCAS provide a model 
worth exploring. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with a review of Congolese history, including events that led up to the 
Second Congo War.  The abbreviated geographic complex adaptive system illuminates some 
ways that the Second Congo War operated and also displayed shifts in power that might have 
contributed to the war’s mass killing.  Given that the case study above is merely a schematic, 
much more research will need to occur to make the model a valuable tool for pragmatic and 
nuanced prevention efforts. 
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Conclusion: Implications, Limitations, and Areas for Further Research 
 
The paper’s use of complexity science, systems thinking, and geography to analyze mass 
killing allowed for the exploration of three key points.  First, mass killing is a complex 
phenomenon that requires nuanced analysis and policy response.  The post-Cold War transition 
to seeing mass killing as a component of broader political violence calls for narratives that go 
beyond state-based geopolitics.  Crises in DRC, Syria, Nigeria, and elsewhere operate based on 
numerous meso- and micro-level dynamics and well as national and global ones.  Many of the 
international system’s “tools in the toolbox,” need to accommodate this complexity by going 
beyond the convention - sanctions, rhetorical condemnation, and military intervention.  Long-
term development initiatives including state- and civil society-building are crucial prevention 
enterprises.   
Second, geography deserves a greater role in mass killing analysis.  The spatialized 
nature of mass killing lends itself to a discipline that explores how spaces are shaped by the 
environment and human systems, in this case conflict systems.  McDoom, Guhaug, Kirsch, Flint, 
Tyner and many more explore a variety of geographic concepts from constructed spaces to the 
loss of strength gradient that can be integrated into existing frameworks.   
Third, understanding how power functions in systems is essential to understanding the 
ontology of mass killing.  Solomon argues “a greater role for power relationships...in 
determining response outcomes” and this paper argues a greater role for them in prevention 
analysis.  Geographies of power aid in specifying how agents gain and maintain different kinds 
of power.  This shifting distribution changes how agents interact with each other, therefore 
changing the system at-large.  Significant long-term power shifts such as a decaying state or 
militarization have the potential to present opportunities for mass killing. 
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This paper posits that a way to analyze the ontology of mass killing is a hybrid schematic 
called geographic complex adaptive systems that combine complex adaptive systems and 
geographies of power.  GCAS are a way to respect the complexity of human systems.  Positions 
that are either paralyzed by complexity or attempt to resolve it through excessive categorization 
and classification deserve critical attention.  Research with the goal of increasing mass killing 
prevention effectiveness, such as this paper, should consider adopting a compromise position that 
neither is overwhelmed by or dismissive of complexity.  In other words, “empirical 
observation...requires a measure of categorization,”222 but not categorization that reaches the 
point of oversimplification.   
Adding complexity to conflict analysis is important, but should not be the only goal of 
research.  Complexity for complexity’s sake will do little to improve prevention policy; a degree 
of simplification is necessary for actionable policy.  The schematic described in chapters two and 
three is admittedly one that simplifies and categorizes, but it has the potential to bring more 
complexity to current theories.  The prevention community could benefit from embracing 
complexity science as an integral component of analysis. 
 GCAS involve seeing the system, mapping the system, identifying relationships, and 
creating a geography of power; it is an explicitly geographic and utilizes the unique ways that 
geographers see human systems - spatially, integrated, and constructed.  The five stages each 
serve a specific analytical purpose that helps reach the goal of understanding how mass killing 
comes to be.  They can also begin to tackle the vexing questions around why mass killing 
happens in some conflicts, but not others.   	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GCAS are not tangible models, but rather a way of understanding conflict and can serve 
as a schematic for a more robust analytical lens.  The figures used throughout this paper are 
meant to illustrate crucial components of conflict that deserve analysis - agents, relationships, 
power, and so on.  However, complexity science analysis does not have to end with tangible 
figures.  Expanding system boundaries beyond the main actors could be a useful exercise for 
scholars and policymakers alike.  Syria, for instance, involves more than Assad, the opposition, 
the U.S., U.N., Iran, and Russia.  EU trade policy and Saudi Arabian material support, as 
examples, are often overlooked, and systems thinking might be able to account for a diverse 
variety of agents.  Similarly, analyzing relationships between agents and how power affects their 
actions is a transferable principle of complexity science; these exercises can exist independent of 
GCAS. 
GCAS departs from some conventional ways of viewing mass killing.  Stages of conflict 
might be ineffective because they do not allow for delays, backsliding, or adequate complexity.  
Risk factor lists can lack sufficient context-specific information and fail to address the 
uniqueness of country-specific risk aggregation.  While GCAS use categories, such as normal 
state versus at-risk state, high power versus low power, and subsystems, they categorize aspects 
of the conflict, not the conflict itself.  In other words, categorizing levels of power that agents 
have, for instance, is different than saying that a conflict at-large moves from one stage to the 
next all at once.  Also, the shifts in power that provide opportunities for mass killing often occur 
over a long period of time and may not necessarily be discrete. 
 There are research and policy implications for using GCAS to analyze mass killing.  First, 
they have the potential to contribute to an emerging paradigm within conflict studies that views 
mass killing as an adaptive system, rather than a teleological end.  Instead of seeing mass killing 
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as the final stage of a linear process, GCAS see it as part of an evolutionary network where 
killing can come and go as circumstances change.  According to Valentino’s thesis, agents will 
find the logic of mass killing more appealing when they think it can help them accomplish their 
goals.  This does not necessarily have to come after a discrete list of preconditions.  All too often 
policymakers and conflict experts wait as violence escalates, warning about impending mass 
killing as their voices echo off of empty legislative chambers.  Ban Ki-Moon, in February 2014, 
discussed the plight of Syrians while commemorating the 20th anniversary of the genocide in 
Rwanda,223 invoking an implicit comparison between the two knowing that the opportunities for 
action were few.   
Instead of waiting for the next horrifying stage of violence to occur, a robust prevention 
research canon, involving GCAS, could continue to be developed in order to proactively address 
mass killing.  The key to using GCAS as a prevention aid is creating the models prior to a 
conflict’s mass killing; they are not merely post facto analytical tools.  If they are created for 
watchlist countries before mass killing, they can lend insight into where and how it might begin.  
This requires a level of understanding that goes beyond conventional media narratives and delves 
into the area’s politico-social dynamics.  
Tangible policy action, even with better research, will be difficult.224  Mass killing 
prevention remains on the margins of U.S. foreign policy, both as a moral and national security 
priority.  Change emanating from the halls of Congress has arguably become less feasible in a 
post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan, and post-Great Recession political environment.  The Obama 
administration has taken steps to increase its capacity such as creating the Atrocities Prevention 
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Board in 2012225 and appointing Samantha Power226, a noted genocide expert,227 as Ambassador 
to the U.N.  Despite these positive steps, recent crises in Syria, Burma, Central African Republic, 
Nigeria and elsewhere prove the need for strategic, determined efforts by the mass killing 
prevention community.   
Despite GCAS’ utility, they have notable limitations.  First, the cleanliness of the 
schematic will rarely translate into analysis.  Complicating factors such as rapidly shifting power 
centers and the evolutionary nature of agents and subsystems will make analyzing GCAS 
difficult.  Second, the inherent complexity of GCAS makes them a time-consuming method.  The 
DRC case study is, again, a highly simplified representation of a GCAS.  A GCAS is never 
complete; there could always be more agents and relationships.  Much of the DRC research 
canon, for example, adequately addresses which agents should be included within the GCAS.  
There are projects that map rebel groups, make connections to regional actors, and trace the 
history of intervention.  However, the paralysis of complexity still seems to be present.  Third, is 
the paper’s heavy focus on the politico-scientific components of mass killing.  A comprehensive 
understanding will require anthropology, economics, environmental studies, psychology, 
sociology, and more.  The extremely simplified model outlined in chapters two and three is 
merely a potential starting point. 
 In order to make GCAS better over time, more research must be conducted regarding 
localized relationships228 between agents as well as a continuous re-evaluation of power centers 
and leverage points.  Another limitation of GCAS is that they are oriented toward a negative 	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peace.  They merely aim to prevent the slide into mass killing and do not necessarily help with a 
positive peace agenda involving civil society and judicial sector capacity-building or poverty 
alleviation, as examples.   
The research agenda for the mass killing prevention community is vast and wide-
ranging.229  From building early warning systems to grasping the role of emerging economic 
powers, the ways to approach a fuller understanding of mass killing are nearly endless.  
Regarding GCAS, future research needs to begin to identify which agents and relationships 
should be prioritized based on themes throughout multiple systems.  Particular agents, for 
example a country’s executive, will appear in most systems, but others are less obvious.  The 
long-term shifts in power also deserve critical attention in order to determine which shifts are 
most likely to present mass killing opportunities.  Lastly, research could explore how GCAS, or 
components of them, particularly geographic ones, could be incorporated into other conflict 
frameworks such as risk factor lists and statistical modeling. 
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